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SAVING LIVES
SHALINI B HARGAVA RAY
Abstract: When Alan Kurdi, a Syrian toddler, drowned in the Mediterranean
while fleeing civil war in his home country, the world's attention turned to the
Syrian refugee crisis. Offers to transport and house refugees surged. Private boats
set out on the Mediterranean Sea to rescue refugees dying in the water. A billion-
aire offered to purchase an island on which the refugees could live out their lives.
This Article analyzes private humanitarian aid to asylum seekers, a subset of mi-
grants whose claims for refugee protection have not yet been filed or adjudicated,
and who typically travel without authorization. This Article determines that much
of this aid is currently illegal or operates under a cloud of legal uncertainty, prin-
cipally due to criminal laws prohibiting the smuggling, transport, and harboring
of unauthorized migrants. In light of the compelling humanitarian interests at
stake, as well as asylum states' concern for national security, this Article argues
for law reform to decriminalize private humanitarian aid to asylum seekers.
INTRODUCTION
Activists often speak as though the solutions we need have not yet been
launched or invented, as though we are starting from scratch, when often
the real goal is to amplify the power and reach of existing alternatives.
What we dream of is already present in the world.
-Rebecca Solnit1
On the day of his death, Syrian toddler Alan Kurdi wore a bright red shirt,
blue shorts, and sneakers. His family fled the violence in Syria and planned to
© 2017, Shalini Bhargava Ray. All rights reserved.
* University of Alabama School of Law. A.B., Stanford University; J.D., Harvard Law School. I
am grateful to Berta Hernandez-Truyol, Shani King, Peter Margulies, Martha Minow, Gerald Neu-
man, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, and Sharon Rush for comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I also bene-
fited from feedback received from participants in the AALS Immigration Law Panel, especially Jen-
nifer Moore; the Immigration Law Teachers Workshop, especially Lori Nessel and Elissa Steglich; the
Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty, especially Steven Nam and Huyen Pham; and the
LWI Writers Workshop, especially Debbie Borman, Amy Griffin, and Kim Holst. I also benefited
from valuable exchanges with Alyson Flournoy, Audrey Macklin, Deborah Cupples, Stacey Stein-
berg, and Sugata Ray. I thank Berta Hernandez-Truyol for suggesting the title, "Saving Lives."
Shamika Dalton at the University of Florida Legal Information Center, Penny Gibson and Blake Beals
of the Bounds Law Library at the University of Alabama, Samuel Alexander, and Julia Kapusta pro-
vided exceptional research assistance.
1 REBECCA SOLNIT, HOPE IN THE DARK: UNTOLD HISTORIES, WILD POSSIBILITIES, at xvii (3d
ed., 2016).
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travel to the Greek island of Kos to apply for asylum, and then reunite with
family in Canada.2 He and his brother, Galip, together with their parents, Ri-
hanna and Abdullah, boarded a dinghy boat from Bodrum, Turkey. Only Ab-
dullah survived.3
Abdullah Kurdi was a barber from Damascus.4 The family found Damas-
cus a "cosmopolitan" oasis in an otherwise fractured region. Abdullah and his
family, however, increasingly found themselves in peril as the conflict in Syria
continued. In response to protests against Syrian president Bashar al-Assad,
the family relocated to Kobani, a small town along the Turkish border with a
large Kurdish community.6 Despite not provoking either side, the family in-
habited a world of daily violence. In September of 2014, the violence wors-
ened, as the Islamic State ("Daesh") shelled Kobani, sending families running
for their lives. After younger extended family members witnessed a suicide
bombing, the police sought out the male elders for questioning. At that point,
the family decided to flee.
Abdullah went first. He fled to Turkey, found work, and sent money home.8
He eventually called for his own family to join him. Life in Turkey, however,
proved impossible financially, as Abdullah was unable to support the four of
them. He devised a plan to reunite with family in Canada. He borrowed money
for a dinghy boat to carry his family from Bodrum to Kos, where they would
apply for asylum. 9 Once they received refugee status, they could travel to Can-
ada. Abdullah's sister had already raised $20,000 to sponsor them. 10
Abdullah approached the journey with caution. Many had died on similar
voyages; but some had lived, and those who had survived were thriving in
their new homelands. " A smuggler made the arrangements, and on September
2, 2015, along with another raft of refugees, they set out on one of the safest
routes to Europe. 12 The sea, however, was wild, and the journey quickly turned
perilous. The smuggler abandoned the boat, leaving Abdullah to take the boat's
tiller, "swerv[ing] over the waves." 13 The boat capsized. The family held on to
Abdullah, who clung to the boat, kissed one of his sons, and implored them
2 Anne Barnard, Syrian Family's Tragedy Goes Beyond Image of Boy on Beach, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 27, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2jKtUqA [https://perma.cc/2WTW-GEQM]. Alan Kurdi is also re-
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both not to let go. Despite his efforts, the waves washed his family away: Ri-
hanna, Galip, and Alan, "one by one." 14 A day later, Alan's body washed up on
to the beach, face down, a lifeless doll. He was still wearing his clothes and
sneakers. 15
The media widely reported the Kurdi family's horror, and the story galva-
nized private citizens across the world. 16 Donations to nongovernmental organ-
izations (NGOs) helping refugees spiked in the days following the discovery of
Alan's body. 17 NGOs sponsoring private boats, which had been conducting
search and rescue for over a year in some instances, saw increased donations
and news coverage of their work. 18 A billionaire businessman from Egypt pub-
licly announced a plan to purchase a Greek Island and name it after Alan.19
141id
15 id.
16 See, e.g., Anne Barnard & Kareem Shoumali, Image of Drowned Syrian, Aylan Kurdi, 3,
Brings Migrant Crisis Into Focus, N.Y. TIES (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
09/04/world/europe/syria-boy-drowning.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/TNW7-K77S]; Gordon
Rayner, Aylan and Galip Kurdi: Everything We Know About Drowned Syrian Refugee Boys, TELE
GRAPH (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/1 1841802/eu-migrant-
crisis-refugee-boys-aylan-galip-kurdi.html [https://perma.cc/AUE2-2LY6]; Yaron Steinbuch, Photo of
Drowned Toddler Causes Outcry Over Migrant Crisis, N.Y. POST (Sept. 2, 2015), http://nypost.
com/2015/09/02/photo-of-drowned- toddler-causes-outcry-over-migrant-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/
PN4G-YJ67]; Ishaan Tharoor, Death of Drowned Syrian Toddler Aylan Kurdi Jolts World Leaders,
WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/03/
image-of-drowned-syrian-toddler-aylan-kurdi-jolts-world-leaders/?utm term=.bclelebl 336e
[https://perma.cc/MZ5G-Q442]; GriffWitte, European Rail Service Hit Hard by Surge of Migrants,
WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2015, at A12.
17 Rick Gladstone & Karen Zraick, Donationsfor Refugees Surging, American Charities Report, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2suT9Bg [https://perma.cc/9P2F-ZCVW]; Lisa O'Carroll,
Donate Cash if You Want to Help Syrian Refugees, Aid Groups Say, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/08/donate-cash-help- syrian-refugees-aid-groups-unicef-
wfp-say [https://perma.cc/B5TB-S47V] (reporting that charities experienced a significant donation
increase after the photograph of Alan Kurdi's body was released, with Save the Children receiving
£1.2 million in just afew days); Megan O'Neil, Photo of Drowned Syrian Child Spurs Spike in Dona-
tions, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Photo-of-
Drowned- Syrian-Child/232957 [https://perma.cc/BV67-GKCX].
18 See Jessica Elgot, Charity Behind Migrant-Rescue Boats Sees 15-Fold Rise in Donations in24
Hours, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/03/charity-
behind-migrant-rescue-boats -sees- 15 -fold-rise-in-donations-in-24-hours [https://perma.cc/B4RW-
PSRD] (Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) reported C150,000 in individual donations in a twen-
ty-four hour period, with a previous high of only C10,000); Jon Henley et al., Britons Rally to Help
People Fleeing War and Terror in Middle East, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.
theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/03/britons-rally-to-help-people-fleeing-war-and-terror-in-middle-
east [https://perma.cc/58L8-P35B] (Caroline Anning, of Save the Children, reported a seventy percent
increase in calls and e-mails in a twenty-four hour period).19 Keren Blankfeld, Afica's 10th Richest Man Still Waiting to Buy a Greek Island to House Ref-
ugees, FORBES (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kerenblankfeld/2015/11/18/africas-
10th-richest-man-still-waiting-to-buy-a-greek-island-to-house-refugees/#3bOled672fde [https://perma.
cc/6Z9B-2LH8] (noting that Naguib Sawaris, the Egyptian billionaire who proposed buying and nam-
ing a Greek island after Alan Kurdi, is still waiting for Greece's approval); Amanda Gomez, Egyptian
Billionaire Wants to Buy Island for Refugees, PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (Sept. 4, 2015),
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Private humanitarian aid to asylum seekers,20 however, occurs amid legal
uncertainty-and in some instances, outright prohibition. The United Nations
Migrant Smuggling Protocol defines smuggling as occurring for "material
benefit, direct or indirect," but states are not required to adopt that restricted
definition.2' As a result, states have remained free to criminalize private acts of
aid as part of standard border control policy.22 The major Western asylum
states, the United States, Canada, and the European Union, have overbroad
statutes criminalizing all instances of alien smuggling and related offenses,
regardless of whether done for financial gain. In the United States, the relevant
statute prohibits a range of actions, including "bringing in," transporting, "con-
ceal[ing], harbor[ing], or shield[ing] from detection" unauthorized migrants.2 3
In Canada, prior to 2015, the anti-smuggling statute criminalized all acts of
aiding and abetting anyone "coming into Canada" without authorization. 24 Fi-
nally, in the EU, member states generally criminalize acts that facilitate unau-
thorized migration without any exception for humanitarian actors.2 5 Thus, for
example, acts of rescue, when coupled with transport of refugees and migrants
to the frontiers of an asylum state, are susceptible to prosecution if the receiv-
26ing state does not consent to receiving those refugees and migrants. In 2004,
Italy prosecuted an NGO carrying rescued African migrants from Ghana and
Nigeria. The NGO, faced with no alternative, docked at an Italian port despite
Italy's express denial of permission to do so.2 Although a judge ultimately
acquitted the NGO, the NGO's prosecution has become a cautionary tale that
private humanitarian actors tell to distinguish and protect their own work.28
Similarly, in the United States, providing housing, food, clothing, and so forth,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/egyptian-billionaire-wants-buy-island-refugees/ [https:!!
perma.cc/5NPK-NNWF].
20 This Article uses the term "asylum seekers" to refer both to internally-displaced persons who
intend to flee to seek humanitarian protection, as well as migrants who have fled their country of
origin for the purpose of seeking humanitarian protection. See infra note 76.
21 Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air arts. 3, 6, Nov. 15, 2000,
2241 U.N.T.S. 480 [hereinafter Migrant Smuggling Protocol]. Article 6.1 criminalizes smuggling and
related offenses, such as "enabling" an unauthorized migrant to "remain" in the destination state with-
out complying with the destination state's requirements for lawful presence.22 Combatting Migrant Smuggling into the EU: Main Instruments, PARL. EUR. Doc. (PE 581.391)
7 (2016) (noting that most member states do not "decriminali[z]e humanitarian assistance to smuggled
migrants").
21 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2012).24
Regina v. Appulonappa, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 754, 19 (Can.). The current statute prohibits organ-
izing, instigating, aiding or abetting entry into Canada that "is or would be in contravention of' the
statute. Immigration & Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, § 117 (Can.) [hereinafter IRPA].
Generally, this includes acts such as trafficking, smuggling and hiding migrants for profit, but no
longer applies to humanitarian assistance. I §§ 117-119.
25 See infra notes 243-245 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 247-258 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 247-258 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 110-114 and accompanying text.
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has constituted illegal "harboring' 29 because providing such aid facilitates asy-
lum seekers' "unlawful presence."30 Such legal doctrine has led to the prosecu-
tion of humanitarian actors, including individuals assisting Central American
migrants in Arizona and Texas as part of the Sanctuary Movement of the
1980s.f
Since its inception, international law has avoided any explicit protection
for private humanitarian aid to refugees. 3 2 Although international law does not
offer clear authorization for private humanitarian aid to refugees, some argue
that such aid finds indirect support in international law.33 First, evidence sug-
gests that he drafters of the Refugee Convention believed that certain aid to
refugees should not be criminalized, but the treaty stopped short of explicitly
authorizing such aid (or forbidding its criminalization under a party state's
domestic law).3 4 Some scholars have drawn on international humanitarian law
for support, suggesting that customary international law requires private indi-
viduals to provide temporary refuge to those fleeing war zones. 3 5 The status of
temporary refuge as a customary norm, however, is unsettled.3 6 Accordingly,
international humanitarian law offers at best indirect support for the legality of
private humanitarian aid to refugees.
This Article argues that private humanitarian aid takes a variety of forms
that benefit both asylum seekers and civil society. To realize the full potential
of private humanitarian aid, the major Western asylum states-specifically, the
United States, Canada, and the European Union-should decriminalize private
humanitarian aid to asylum seekers by redefining smuggling-related offenses
to require financial or material benefit of any kind, consistent with internation-
al law, or by adopting an exception for humanitarian assistance.
3
29 See infra notes 182-190 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 182-190 and accompanying text; see also EishaJain, Immigration Enforcement
and Harboring Doctrine, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 159-60 (2010).
31 See infra notes 182-190 and accompanying text.
32 See Arthur Helton, Ecumenical, Municipal and Legal Challenges to United States Refugee
Policy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 493,511 (1986) (discussing absence of explicit authorization for
private aid to refugees in various international instruments).
33 See id.
34 See id.; see also U.N. ECOSOC, 2d sess., 40th mtg. at 8-9, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.40 (Sept.
27, 1950) (comments of Mr. Juvigny, French delegate). But see Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (noting that recourse to the "preparatory work" ofa
treaty is permitted only as a "supplementary means of interpretation," which suggests that a delegate's
comments have limited interpretive value).
35 See Helton, supra note 32, at 516 (noting that the United States recognizes "the international
humanitarian norms of temporary refuge and nonrefoulement").
36 See id.; see also Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1103, 1168 (1990) (discussing a federal court's ruling that
Congress preempted the temporary refuge norm with the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980).
37 The U.S. Senate considered such an amendment as part of a package of immigration law re-
forms, but these reforms ultimately failed to become law. See Emily Breslin, Note, The Road to Lia-
bility Is Paved with Humanitarian Intentions: Criminal Liability for Housing Undocumented People
1230 [Vol. 58:1225
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Although other scholars have discussed U.S. state and federal aws that
essentially criminalize private charity to undocumented immigrants, including
asylum seekers,38 this Article is the first to offer a comparative analysis of the
laws governing private humanitarian aid to asylum seekers with reference to
the worlds' richest asylum states and regions-namely, the United States, Can-
ada, and the European Union. This comparative approach is essential because
the problem of how to treat those who assist irregular migrants is a global one.
Unlike the narrower question of U.S. law, on which judges might disagree
about the relevance of foreign states' laws and practices, the question of how to
treat private humanitarian actors assisting asylum seekers calls for a global
response informed by international and comparative law.
Apart from offering a unique comparative approach, t is Article is also
the first to propose a major statutory revision to refine the smuggling statute to
limit liability to profit-seeking actors rather than on those who conceal asylum
seekers from immigration authorities. Ultimately, this Article argues that under
current legal regimes, too much private humanitarian aid is criminalized or
potentially subject to prosecution, and thus, deterred. For this reason, citizens
should insist that governments reform their smuggling laws.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes various manifesta-
tions of private humanitarian assistance to asylum seekers, and the legal
framework within which they operate.3 9 Part II discusses national security and
economic interests as primary motivations for criminalizing private humanitar-
ian assistance, both nationally and internationally. 4 Part III proposes a legal
compromise by criminalizing unauthorized migration activities that provide
some monetary or material benefit to smugglers, but de-criminalizing not-for-
41profit private humanitarian assistance.
Under 8 U.S.C. 1324(A)(1)(A)(III), 11 RUT. J.L. & RELIGION 214, 241 (2009) (describing proposed
humanitarian exception); Sean Higgins, Why Immigration Reform Didn't Happen in 2007, WASH.
EXAMINER (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/why-immigration-reform-didnt-
happen-in-2007/article/2513987 [https://perma.cc/BKK7-EN7D].
38 This analysis has related primarily to the Sanctuary and New Sanctuary Movements of the
United States. See Breslin, supra note 37, at 226; Kristina M. Campbell, Humanitarian Aid Is Never a
Crime? The Politics of Immigration Enforcement and the Provision of Sanctuary, 63 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 71, 100-01 (2012); Helton, supra note 32, at 511; Gregory A. Loken & Lisa R. Babino, Harbor-
ing, Sanctuary and the Crime of Charity Under Federal Immigration Law, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 119, 123-24 (1993). Notably, criminal statutes prohibiting aid do not apply to individuals assist-
ing in preparing asylum applications or aiding asylum seekers who have filed an application but have
not yet received a decision. I thank Peter Margulies for aising this point.
39 See infra notes 42-193 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 194-314 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 315-374 and accompanying text.
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I. DANGEROUS JOURNEY AND THE MANY PLACES OF
PRIVATE HUMANITARIAN AID
This Part defines and describes "private humanitarian aid" in its many
forms and explains its value to both asylum seekers and citizens of the states
receiving them. Private humanitarian aid refers to assistance designed to pre-
serve life and human dignity, and ease suffering associated with "man-made
crises" and natural disasters,4 2 provided by non-state actors for altruistic or
non-material reasons.43 Humanitarian aid further connotes immediacy-
immediate relief from an imminent threat. 44 Aid can also extend beyond such
relief to longer-term provision of food, housing, medical care, and education,
all informed by broad humanitarian, protective interests.4 5
A discussion of private humanitarian aid to asylum seekers requires ome
analysis of the legal regime that produces asylum seekers' dangerous j ourneys
in the first place. 46 Asylum seekers principally undertake unauthorized travel
because states offer them no travel authorization options.4 No country current-
ly offers an "asylum visa" to migrants who intend to apply for refugee status
upon arrival in the asylum state.48 Thus, when driven from their homes, asylum
seekers must use false papers or seek the services of a smuggler.49 These ave-
nues of travel subject asylum seekers to tremendous danger, which some pri-
vate humanitarian actors work to alleviate.
Private humanitarian aid takes many forms, beginning in an asylum seek-
ers' country of origin and ending in the asylum state. The most visible form of
42 Defining Humanitarian Assistance, DEV. INITIATIVES, http://devinit.org/defining-humanitarian-
assistance/ [https://perma.cc/ASZ2-VC3A].
43 Not all donations constitute "humanitarian assistance." For example, if the nonprofit arm of a
Silicon Valley company decided to donate coding lessons to asylum seekers to assist with job training
in the asylum state, few would regard this as humanitarian aid, although it certainly would constitute a
nonprofit donation. See, e.g., Coding Skills for Over 430,000 Young Africans and Refugees in the
Middle East, SAP NEWS (Nov. 30,2016), http://news.sap.com/coding-skills-for-over-430000-young-
africans-and-refugees-in-the-middle-east [https://perma.cc/BBG5-NY6A].
44 See RELIEFWEB, GLOSSARY OF HUMANITARIAN TERMS 29 (2008), http://reliefweb.int!
sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4F99A3C28EC37DOEC12574A4002E89B4-reliefweb aug2008.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RHB-8FMH] (defining Humanitarian Assistance as aid that aims to preserve life
and "alleviate suffering of a crisis affected population," and which must align "with the basic humani-
tarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality").
45 See id. at 8, 39.
46 See Hugh Eakin, The Terrible Flight from the Killing, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 22, 2015),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/10/22/terrible-flight-killing/ [https:!!web.archive.org/web/
20170422124739/http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/10/22/terribe-flight-killing/] (describing the
human toll of the lack of any legal course of travel for asylum seekers).47 See, e.g., Slobodan Djaji6, Asylum Seeking and IrregularMigration, 39 INT'L REV. L. &ECON.
83, 84 (2014) (describing asylum seekers' necessary resort to human smuggling due to lack of availa-
bility of any kind of entry visa to an asylum state).
48 Shalini Bhargava Ray, Optimal Asylum, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1215, 1219 (2013).
49 Id. at 1231 ("Thus, the asylum system expects and relies upon illegal or deceptive entry.").
1232 [Vol. 58:1225
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humanitarian assistance is rescue. Chris and Regina Catrambone, a wealthy
couple, run a fully equipped yacht in the Mediterranean to rescue asylum seek-
ers and migrants from unseaworthy vessels.50 Their project, called Migrant
Offshore Assistant Station ("MOAS"), has thus far rescued more than 30,000
people.51 A group of German friends from Brandenburg similarly responded to
"the devastating loss of life at sea" by buying a boat and setting out on the
Mediterranean to provide "a civil sea rescue service" for asylum seekers and
52migrants in distress. An Eritrean Catholic priest in Switzerland facilitates
rescue less directly by receiving calls from desperate asylum seekers and mi-
grants in the Mediterranean and then informing the Italian authorities of the
boats' location.
Rescue, though highly visible, is not the only form of private humanitari-
an aid offered in the wake of recent war-born migrations. The Pope has urgedS 54
parishes in Europe to accept refugees into their homes.5 Individuals in Ger-
many have signed up to read to refugee children, teach asylum seekers Ger-
man, and offer job training, pending approval of the their asylum petitions.55
Private individuals also rejected stingy government policy in Iceland. After
Iceland's minister offered to resettle a mere fifty Syrians, Icelanders created a
Facebook page welcoming refugees, and in some instances, offering to house
them; this page garnered 10,000 "likes., 56 A U.S. mother launched Carry the
Future, an NGO that delivers baby carriers to refugee parents carrying their
50 See, e.g., Jessica Elgot, Migrant Crisis: Good Samaritans Set Sail in Daring Mediterranean
Rescue Mission, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/
migrant-crisis-good-samaritans-mediterranean-rescue-mission [https://perma.cc/G4J5-X7XV]; Sheena
McKenzie, Meet the Wealthy Couple on a Mission to Save Drowning Migrants, CNN (Apr. 20, 2015),
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/20/sport/boat-migrants-mediterranean-drown-moas/ [https://pema.cc/
RD23-VUM4].
51 About MOAS, MOAS, https://www.moas.eu/about/ [https://perma.cc/36XY-F4FC].
52 Sea-Watch Rescue Blog, HUM. RTS. AT SEA (May 1, 2015), https://www.humanrightsatsea.
org/news/sea-watch-migrant-rescue-blog/ [https://perma.cc/Y68P-VFDH].
53 Mattathias Schwartz, The Anchor, NEW YORKER (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2014/04/21/the-anchor [https://perma.cc/YGY5-SMG4].54 See Anthony Faiola & Michael Birnbaum, Pope Calls on Europe's Catholics to Take in Refu-
gees, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/refugees-keep-streaming-
into-europe-as-crisis-continues-unabated/2015/09/06/8a330572-5345- 1 le5 b225-90edbd49f362
story.html [https://perma.cc/9FBM-36HL] (noting Pope Francis appealed to all religious communities
and institutions to "take in" a refugee family, which could provide "shelter to tens of thousands").
55 Martin Knobbe et al., Welcome to Germany: Locals Step in to Help Refugees in Need, DER
SPIEGEL (Aug. 18,2015), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugees-encounter-willing-
helpers-in-germany-a- 1048536.html [https://perma.cc/9RLE-LSF3].
56 Elliot Hannon, Iceland Caps Syrian Refugees at 50; More Than 10,000 People Respond with
Support for Syrian Refugees, THE SLATIST (Aug. 31, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the slatest/
2015/08/31/ 10 000 icelanders offer to house syrian refugees.html [https://perma.cc/H52N-
XAVA].
2017]
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toddlers for hundreds of miles across Europe. An Egyptian billionaire sought
to purchase a Greek island on which refugees could live out their lives.8 Pri-
vate humanitarian aid emerges where governments fail to meet the needs of
asylum seekers and migrants. Fully understanding the impact of asylum states'
policies, and where they fall short, requires analyzing these diverse forms of
aid together as a unified phenomenon.
This Part describes private humanitarian aid to asylum seekers at each
point along the geographic continuum: while asylum seekers reside in their
country of origin, seek exit from their country of origin, travel to the asylum
state, seek entry into the asylum state, and reside in the asylum state. By illus-
trating examples of private humanitarian aid administered in each place, this
Part provides a foundation for subsequent analysis of barriers to private hu-
manitarian aid and the rationales for legal restrictions.
A. In-Country Aid
The first place where individuals and private organizations provide aid to
asylum seekers is the asylum seekers' home country. Such aid often takes the
form of donations to NGOs such as the International Committee for the Red
Cross ("ICRC") or Doctors Without Borders (also known as M6decins Sans
Frontidres, or "MSF"). These NGOs provide basic provisions for daily life in
war-torn places. For example, the Syrian Civil Defense, known as the "White
Helmets," has saved over 95,024 people from barrel bomb attacks in Syria. 9
This corps of unarmed and neutral rescue workers saves lives, secures build-
ings, and performs other public services to assist "people on all sides of the
conflict." 60
Even though international relief organizations assist a broader population
than just refugees, donations to such NGOs may still reflect the public's inter-
est in helping refugees specifically. For example, after the New York Times
published an image of Syrian toddler Alan Kurdi's lifeless body, drowned in
the Mediterranean, NGOs like MSF saw donations increase sevenfold.61 Alt-
hough MSF typically receives donations of $30,000 a day, donations spiked to
$200,000 the first day after Kurdi's photograph appeared in the papers and
62then decreased to around $80,000 four days later. Thus, members of the pub-
lic are ready to donate money to NGOs that help asylum seekers. Private aid
57 See FAQ, CARRY THE FUTURE, http://www.carrythefuture.org/faq/ [https://perma.cc/4D4V-
YJSC].
58 Gomez, supra note 19.
59 Support the White Helmets, WHITE HELMETS, https://www.whitehelmets.org/en [https:II
perma.cc/MQX7-Y6NW].
60 Id.
61 See O'Neil, supra note 17.
62 Id.
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often takes the form of donations to NGOs working on the ground in asylum
seekers' home countries-even if those NGOs focus on issues beyond asylum.
International relief organizations, however, often face political or practi-
cal restrictions to administering aid inside a conflict zone.6' Aid workers may
face violence or death, bandits may steal supplies, and the home country's
government may severely restrict the operation of NGOs .64 In 2015, the United
States inadvertently bombed an MSF clinic in Kunduz, Afghanistan, killing
thirty patients and staff.65 MSF contends that it had supplied its GPS coordi-
nates to the U.S. military prior to the bombing, but the U.S. military nonethe-
less mistakenly thought the hospital to be "a Taliban-seized government build-
ing. ',66 In another example, insurgents attacked humanitarian aid providers in
Iraq during and after the Iraq war, because they mistakenly believed that aid
67workers were mere instruments of the U.S. military. These incidents illus-
trate the inherent dangers of operating in a conflict zone, which often make it
impossible to work within refugees' countries of origin.
Apart from political or practical impediments, some NGOs face concerns
about their legitimacy. For example, the NGO Hand in Hand for Syria ("Hand
in Hand") was created in 2011 shortly after the Syrian crisis began, and it pro-
vides aid solely within Syria.6' The organization seeks to stabilize conditions
so that Syrians do not feel compelled to flee.69 Hand in Hand claims to use
funds raised from European donors to purchase food and medical supplies in
Turkey, one of the places where it is officially registered, and in Syria to boost
the local economy. The organization states that it then quickly provides aid in
places that other NGOs fail to reach, such as locations behind front lines and in
remote areas.71 Due to the scope of the conflict, Hand in Hand now operates in
ninety percent of the country. 2
63 See About Us, HAND IN HAND FOR SYRIA, https://hihfad.org/about [https://perma.cc/TTM7-
9HAG].
64 See id.




67 Government rhetoric conflating military action and humanitarian aid also increases the danger
to humanitarian aid providers. In the Iraq War, the United States government represented the military
objective as one and the same as the humanitarian one-liberating the unfree and providing the basics
that Saddam Hussein had failed to provide, namely adequate electricity, medical f cilities, and water.
This, in turn, made aid workers more vulnerable. See Nicolas de Torrente, Humanitarian Action Un-
der Attack: Reflections on the Iraq War, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 22-23 (2004).
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A Canadian research group, however, has suggested that the organization
actually supports political militants opposed to Assad.7' British authorities
have also critiqued Hand in Hand for essentially serving as a cover for the Syr-
ian opposition. Even if this critique were inaccurate, and legitimate charities
do disburse funds in Syria, funds are notoriously difficult to track once they
arrive in the conflict zone. Authorities note that they cannot guarantee that
funds do not support militants. Given the lack of clarity over the legitimacy
of various relief organizations, donors often lack sufficient information when
donating funds to assist displaced persons while such persons remain in their
war-torn home country. These are the potential hazards of private aid in the
country of origin. As a result, much of the private aid provided to asylum seek-
ers is provided in some other place.
B. Exit
Private actors also administer aid at the next place in the geographic con-
tinuum by facilitating asylum seekers' travel out of their country of origin, of-
ten using unofficial channels. Human smugglers are private actors who facili-
tate exit, primarily by using fraudulent documents or arranging travel in ves-
sels not designed for humans. If such work is done for material benefit, it
73 Robert Stuart, UK Charity Which Shares Syrian Opposition "Aims and Objectives" Benefits
from Alan Kurdi Tragedy, GLOB. RES. (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.globalresearch.ca/uk-charity-
which- shares- syrian-opposition-aims-and-obj ectives-benefits- from-alan-kurdi-tragedy/5475090
[https://perma.cc/7T6L-GRYE].
74 id.
75 Christopher Hope, Charity Cash 'Going to Syrian Terror Groups,' TELEGRAPH (Oct. 4,2013),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10357537/Charity-cash-going-to-
Syrian-terror-groups.html [http://perma.cc/VLC6-ZC43].
76 Technically, refugees are people who have already fled their country of origin; persons who
remain within their country of origin are more typically referred to as "internally displaced persons."
Questions and Answers About IDPs, U.N. HuM. RTS., OFF. HIGH COMM'R, http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/Issues.aspx [https://perma.cc/J2DG-GAZV] (explaining that, "[a] crucial
requirement to be considered a 'refugee' is crossing an international border"). "Asylum seekers" are
people whose claim for "sanctuary" has not yet been adjudicated. See Asylum-Seekers, U.N. HIGH
COMM'N REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/asylum-seekers.html [https://perma.cc/VDU8-
2DZL]. But to simplify matters, this Article uses "asylum seekers" to refer both to internally displaced
persons and refugees in this context.
77 See Adam Lidgett, Syrian Refugee Smugglers Arrested: Human Trafficking Charges in Nether-
lands AllegedAfter Hundreds Illegally Taken to Holland, Police Say, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Sept. 18,2015),
http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-refugee-smugglers-arrested-human-trafficking-charges-netherlands-
alleged-after-2103559 [https://web.archive.org/web/20160122133028/http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-
refugee- smugglers-arrested-human- trafficking-charges-netherlands-alleged-after-2103559] (describ-
ing smugglers in Netherlands with partners who coordinated exit of refugees from various Syrian
cities to destinations such as Athens, Budapest, Milan, and Vienna).
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cannot be considered "humanitarian." ' 8 Local smugglers in Syria, for example,
oversee asylum seekers' clearance "through all Syrian checkpoints on the way
to Turkey" in exchange for bribes.79 As of September 2015, Europol estimated
30,000 smugglers are transporting asylum seekers out of their countries of
origin and into potential asylum states. 8o
Private individuals often aid asylum seekers in exiting their home coun-
tries in more benign ways as well. For example, a family member might drive
an asylum seeker across a border into a third country, where a smuggler might
then provide a fake passport. " The family member has privately aided the asy-
lum seeker in crossing the border, but then it falls upon a smuggler to provide
papers and a plan to circumvent border controls. 8 2 Ultimately, informal smug-
gling out of the country of origin remains a significant element of most asylum
seekers' journeys. 83
C. Rescue
Once an asylum seeker crosses the border out of their home country and
into a new territory, the journey to an asylum state begins in earnest. Private
actors play an important role in preventing death along the way. 84 For asylum
seekers at sea or otherwise in transit to the asylum state, the risk of distress or
death is real. At least 22,000 migrants have died "trying to reach Europe" since
2000.85 In 2013, a group of 360 migrants, consisting of mostly Eritreans,
drowned off the coast of the Italian island of Lampedusa. 8 6 In just one month
in 2014, 700 migrants and refugees drowned in two different shipwrecks. 87 As
a result, governments in recent years have conducted search and rescue opera-
tions to limit the humanitarian costs of traveling to Europe. In particular, Italy
78 Botjan Videmek, In the Human Smugglers' Den, POLITICO (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.
politico.eu/article/refugee-crisis- smugglers- syria-turkey-migrants- he-worlds-largest-human-bazaar-
migration-refugees-smugglers-greece-turkey/ [https://perma.cc/AXL8-8FDU].
79 See id.
so Lidgett, supra note 77.
81 See Nicholas Schmidle, Ten Borders, NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2015/10/26/ten-borders [https://perma.cc/PCE4-2H97].
82 See id.
83 See Susan Raufer, In-Country Processing of Refugees, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 233 (1995).
8 4 
ANNE T. GALLAGHER & FIONA DAVID, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING
446 (2014) ("It is privately owned and operated vessels, not designated SAR vessels, which are play-
ing the frontline role in SAR efforts.").
85 Zara Rabinovitch, Pushing Out the Boundaries of Humanitarian Screening with In-Country
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conducted an operation called Mare Nostrum, which rescued at least 140,000
people in 2014.88 Italy eventually suspended the program due to high costs.89
The suspension of Mare Nostrum was part of the European Union's de-
liberate effort to scale back rescue efforts in order to deter refugees and mi-
grants from making the journey in the first place. 9 After suspending the pro-
gram, Italy transferred responsibility to Frontex, the European Union's border
agency.91 Frontex, for its part, conducted a much more limited operation on a
fraction of the budget and without any of its own search and rescue vessels. 92
In fact, Frontex does not officially perform search and rescue or provide access
to humanitarian protection. 93 Limiting rescue efforts, however, failed to deter
refugees and migrants. 
94
In the face of government retrenchment, private humanitarian actors have
entered the search and rescue arena. For example, MSF has been doing rescue
work for over fifteen years. 95 In 2015, MSF teams directly rescued over 20,000
people in the Mediterranean and safely disembarked passengers in Italy more
than eighty times.96 In addition, organizations such as MOAS97 and Sea-
Watch98 expressly focus on rescuing refugees and migrants in unseaworthy
boats to prevent deaths on the way to Europe from Africa and the Middle East.
These organizations erve to substitute, in part, government search and rescue
programs, but they are only effective to the extent that governments cooperate.
MOAS launched its first mission in 2014, a year after nearly 400 refugees
and migrants died off the coast of Lampedusa, an Italian island where many
asylum seekers find themselves before the government deports or processes
them.99 The founders of MOAS, Regina and Chris Catrambone, were inspired
to act by the Pope's sermon condemning global indifference to the plight of
88 Id.
89 The operation cost was nine million euros per month. Id.
90 Sea-Watch Rescue Blog, supra note 52 ("The general opinion in Brussels was that the greater
the rescue capability ... the greater the likelihood more migrants would attempt to enter Europe via
these means.").
91 Id.
92 McKenzie, supra note 50.
93 See Mission and Tasks, FRONTEX, http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/mission-and-tasks/
[https://perma.cc/H2AW-ASSU].
94 McKenzie, supra note 50.
95 
MSF Expands Mediterranean Search and Rescue Operations, DRS. WITHOUT BORDERS (May
9, 2015), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/msf-expands-mediterranean-search-and-
rescue-operations [https://perma.cc/A6VR-DJ9E].96 
MSF Ends Search and Rescue Operations in Central Mediterranean, DRS. WITHOUT B ORDERS
(Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/msf-ends-search-and-rescue-operations-
central-mediterranean [https://perma.cc/6LD8-DJJW].97 About MOAS, supra note 51.
98 Sea-Watch Rescue Blog, supra note 52.
99 McKenzie, supra note 50.
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refugees and migrants. 100 In response, the couple purchased a vessel for rescu-
ing refugees and migrants in distress at sea and named it the "M.Y Phoe-
nix." 10 1
MOAS has saved nearly 12,000 lives since the project began. 102 Using
high-tech drones and thermal night imaging to monitor major migrant shipping
lanes, MOAS can detect the presence of distressed boats and quickly render
aid. 103 When it encounters a vessel in distress, the MOAS crew rescues the in-
dividuals at risk and provides water, food, and basic medical care until gov-
ernment authorities arrive.104 The crew typically consists of 20 people, and in
2015, MOAS partnered with MSF to add two doctors to the crew.105 MOAS
claims that, as an NGO, it is uniquely capable of approaching waters near a
country's coast, which means it can respond more quickly to distressed boats
than vessels affiliated with a particular government. 106 Thus, a lack of govern-
ment affiliation is an important characteristic of MOAS's approach.
Central to MOAS's work is its collaboration with Maritime Rescue Coor-
dination Centers ("MRCCs"), facilities that states must provide to perform
"search and rescue services round their coasts" under international law.107 The
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue establishes the re-
quirement of a system of MRCCs, consisting of centers and sub-centers,
equipped to receive "distress communications" and to communicate with adja-
cent MRCCs.108 The International Maritime Organization set up a network in
1979, known as Inmarsat, to enable ships to call for help "no matter how far
out to sea."1 09 In this way, international law has required states to create infra-
structure to promote rescue at sea, and MOAS's work complements existing
search and rescue practice.
The Sea-Watch project is a similar private rescue operation run by a crew
from Hamburg. Sea-Watch both reacts to distress calls and actively searches
for distressed vessels, as many of these vessels lack satellite phone technology
1oo Id.
101 Id.





106 Claire Ward, For First Time Ever, a Private Rescue Ship Transfers Migrants to UK Warship,
VICE NEWS (May 13, 2015), https://news.vice.com/article/private-humanitarian-rescue-ship-
transfers-migrants-to-uk-warship [https://perma.cc/V27X-24KS] (explaining that because MOAS is
neutral and "not affiliated with any government," representatives assert MOAS can enter Libyan wa-
ters to respond more rapidly to migrants' distress calls).
107 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 98(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; International Convention o  Maritime Search and Rescue preamble,
annex §§ 2.1, 2.2.1, Apr. 27, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,093, 1405 U.N.T.S. 97 [hereinafter ICMSR].
108 ICMSR, supra notel07, at annex § 2.3.3.
109 About Us, INMARSAT, http://www.inmarsat.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/F895-ARXT].
2017] 1239
Boston College Law Review
and cannot make distress calls. 11 0 Sea-Watch operates primarily in the summer
months when refugees and migrants are most likely to undertake the journey
across the Mediterranean, but its search and rescue operations continue into the
fall.111 The organization undertakes "missions" that last about six days each,
with a different crew each time.1 1 2 One of their main tasks is to locate dis-
tressed vessels accurately and then to rescue refugees and migrants from sink-
ing ships. 113 Sea-Watch harbors refugees and migrants on board its boats tem-
porarily and provides life vests until Coast Guard ships arrive. 114
Like MOAS, Sea-Watch operates in an uncertain legal environment, at
the intersection of the duty to rescue under international maritime law, rights
under the Refugee Convention, and prohibitions contained in EU anti-
smuggling legislation.11 5 Under customary international law and the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS"), states should rescue
those in distress at sea. 116 UNCLOS specifically establishes that "masters of
vessels sailing under the flag of signatory States" in international waters have
an affirmative duty to rescue individuals in distress.117 Additional legal support
for rescue comes from both the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea ("SOLAS") and the International Convention on Maritime Search and
Rescue. "' Under these instruments, states are obligated "to cooperate and co-




114 Id. (noting that in accordance with international law, no migrants will be taken on board a Sea-
Watch vessel or ferried to shore). But see Elgot, supra note 50.
115 Sea-Watch Rescue Blog, supra note 52.
116 Efthymios Papastavridis, Interception of Human Beings on the High Seas: A Contemporary
Analysis Under International Law, 36 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 145, 203-04 (2009).
117 UNCLOS states:
1. Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so
without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers: (a) to render assistance
to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed
to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as
such action may reasonably be expected of him; (c) after a collision, to render assis-
tance to the other ship, its crew and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the
other ship of the name of his own ship, its port of registry and the nearest port at which
it will call.
2. Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an
adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea
and, where circumstances so require, by way of mutual regional arrangements co-
operate with neighboring States for this purpose.
UNCLOS, supra note 107, art. 98(1); see Lori A. Nessel, Externalized Borders and the Invisible Ref-
ugee, 40 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 625, 626-27 (2009).118 
GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 84 ("The obligation to render assistance to those lost
or in peril at sea is part of customary international law and has been codified in many international
agreements, including UNCLOS and two widely ratified treaties: the 1974 International Convention
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ordinate" rescue. L9 The act of "rescue" is not complete until those in distress
reach a "place of safety," 120 and courts have ruled that this "place of safety"
must be a place other than the rescuing ship. 121 Scholars have noted, however,
that governments are not necessarily obligated to "disembark the survivors in
[their] own area[s]."122 Thus, although governments must complete th rescue
of those in distress, rescue is not tantamount to a right of admission to the res-
cuing state.
123
The tension evident in rescue work, however, originates outside of mari-
time law, for international refugee law itself places refugees in limbo on their
journey to an asylum state. International refugee law guarantees neither a right
to be granted asylum, nor a right to admission into an asylum state.1 24 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") guarantees "the right to
seek and to enjoy ... asylum from persecution," 125 but scholars have suggest-
ed that states understood this to secure the asylum state's right to grant asylum
without interference from the refugee's country of origin. 126 Article 33 of the
UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, however, prohibits asylum
states from returning refugees to places where they would face persecution. 
127
This raises the question: when does this obligation not to return arise? At the
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention), and the 1979 International Convention on Mari-
time Search and Rescue (SAR Convention)."); Sea-Watch Rescue Blog, supra note 52.119 Guy GOODWIN-GILL &JANEMCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 283-84 (3d
ed., 2007) (discussing amendments to the SAR and SOLAS Conventions to impose this obligation
"with minimal disruption to the ship's planned itinerary (implying that disembarkation should occur at
the nearest coastal State-UNHCR's favoured approach)"); Papastavridis, supra note 116, at 206
(citing GoODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra, at 283).
120 Legal Brief, U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees, Int'l Law and Rescue at Sea 6 (May 19,
2008), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.htm?docid=487b47f12&
query=Refugee%20Protection%20in%201ntemational%20Law [https://perma.cc/U5CS-HB6S] (citing
ICMSR, supra note 101, at annex § 1.3.2); INT'LMARITIME ORG. & U.N. HIGH COMM'R REFUGEES,
RESCUE AT SEA: A GUIDE TO PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE AS APPLIED TO MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES
5-7, http://www.unhcr.org/450037d34.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9QW-ZQKR].
121 GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 457.
122 Papastavridis, supra note 116, at 206.
123 NGOs rely on these international agreements to justify their work. Sea-Watch sails under the
German flag, and Germany is a signatory to UNCLOS and related instruments. Sea- Watch Rescue
Blog, supra note 52. In light of the full range of relevant authorities, Sea-Watch regards its activities
as fulfilling international legal obligations, although these rescue obligations apply because Sea-
Watch desires to patrol the Mediterranean looking for distressed vessels.
124 GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 119, at 35840.
125 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 14(1) (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR]; see Shalini Bhargava Ray, OptimalAsylum, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1215,
1242 (2013) (citing GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 119, at 358, 383).
126 2 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (1972).
127 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [here-
inafter Refugee Convention].
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border of an asylum state's territory? 128 On the high seas?129 At a pre-clearance
point in an airport within the refugee's country of origin? 13 0 Or should the test
be based on the asylum state's exercise ofjurisdiction, understood as "effective
control"?131
The European Court of Human Rights in Hirsi Jamaa & Others v. Italy
ruled that states must "guarantee access to a fair and effective asylum proce-
dure for those intercepted who are in need of international protection." 13 2 In
Hirsi, the court evaluated Italy's responsibility toward refugees interdicted on
the high seas.133 The court held that Italy was exercising jurisdiction extra-
territorially through its interdiction efforts. 114 In a concurring opinion, Judge
Pinto de Albuquerque opined that the European Convention on Human Rights
ban on "collective expulsion" required Italy to provide some screening process
to asylum seekers to determine if they qualified for humanitarian protection
before turning them back. 135 Thus, on this reasoning, states party to the Refu-
gee Convention, which prohibits refoulement, generally have an obligation to
extend some asylum procedure to migrants outside of the migrants' country of
origin to determine whether they are in fact "refugees."
136
128 See THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, ACCESS TO ASYLUM 232-33 (Cambridge Stud. Int'l &
Comp. L., Series No. 77, 2011).
129 See id. at 63.
130 See id. at 131-32 (discussing the Roma Rights case in which the British Court of Appeal ruled
that non-refoulement did not apply to pre-clearance checks by British immigration officers at the Pra-
gue airport, in part because the refugees had not yet left their home country).
131 Id. at46.
132 Hirsi-Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 27; Sea-Watch Rescue Blog,
supra note 52.
133 GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 477.
134 Hirsi-Jamaa, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 78; see also Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Prohibiting Collective
Expulsion of Aliens at the European Court of Human Rights, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/l/prohibiting-collective-expulsion-aliens-european-
court-human-rights [https://perma.cc/F6C6-ZS2N].
135 Hirsi-Jamaa, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. (concurring opinion of J. Pinto Albuquerque); see also Ram-
ji-Nogales, supra note 134.
136 GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 128, at 232-33 ("[S]tates do not rid themselves of interna-
tional obligations simply by offshoring and outsourcing migration control.... Even if it was not the
case fifty years ago, it is today clear that the non-refoulment principle must be interpreted to apply
everywhere a state exercises jurisdiction."); see also David A. Martin, Human Rights and Migration
Management: Of Complexity, Balance, andNuance, 106 AM. Soc'Y INT'LL. PRoc. 69,71-72 (2012)
(interpreting Hirsi-Jamaa to require "shipboard screening of potential claims... and [to suggest] that
such screening may necessitate the provision of lawyers."). The United States Supreme Court has
interpreted non-refoulement far more narrowly, as applying only to refugees at the border or refugees
who have effectuated an entry. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 180-81 (1993)
(ruling that the word "return" in article 33 of the Refugee Convention has a narrower meaning than
the common meaning of the word); see also GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 128, at 45; GAL
LAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 472 (describing competing interpretations of article 33's non-
refoulement obligation).
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Such a right to an asylum procedure and the duty to rescue under mari-
time law, however, have clashed with anti-smuggling laws that criminalize the
transport of unauthorized migrants to an asylum state. 137 These anti-smuggling
laws potentially render illegal some aspects of rescue, 138 and the work of these
NGOs reflects this ambiguity. Although these humanitarian actors publicly
focus on preventing death at sea rather than obtaining legal entry or status for
asylum seekers, such rescue efforts are difficult to divorce from the asylum
seekers' ultimate objective of effectuating an entry into the asylum state. Offi-
cially, MOAS states that i s ultimate goal is to mitigate "loss of life." 13 9 MOAS
will not act as "a migrant ferry," and it will not rescue refugees and migrants
exclusively, but it will use all "its resources to assist appropriate official Res-
cue Coordination Centers to locate and help suffering human beings and save
lives where possible."140 Although MOAS casts its efforts as merely supple-
menting existing government search and rescue operations, such efforts do
much more. They necessarily present governments with decisions to make re-
garding the fate of refugees and migrants. For example, after rescuing refugees
and migrants on a sinking boat in the Mediterranean and supplying them with
water and groceries, what does MOAS do? In light of legal (and perhaps mor-
al) restrictions on transporting bona fide refugees back to their country of
origin, 141 the organization must eventually transfer rescued refugees and mi-
grants to a governmental authority, such as the Italian Coast Guard. But what if
the Coast Guard refuses toaccept them? What would MOAS do in such a situ-
ation? Although the law governing disembarkation of smuggled refugees and
migrants is unclear, scholars indicate "there remains abundant State practice"
137 See, e.g., Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions: EUAction Plan Against
Migrant Smuggling (2015-2020), COM (2015) 285 final (May 27,2015), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/e-library/documents/policies/asylum/general/docs/eu action plan against migrant smuggling
en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5DZ6-LZK8] (proposing an "Action Plan" to reduce migrant smuggling
through enhanced prosecution of smugglers).
138 Tugba Basaran, Saving Lives at Sea: Security, Law and Adverse Effects, 16 EUR. J. MIGRA
TION & L. 365, 377 ("Anti-smuggling legislation can be used to sanction rescue, ven though rescue is
firmly anchored in national and international legislation.").
139 Current Mission-Central Mediterranean, MOAS, http://www.moas.eu/central-mediterranean/
[https://perma.cc/FCW8-NGAB].
140 Elizabeth Mavropoulou, The Success of the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), HUM. RTS.
AT SEA (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.humanrightsatsea.org/the-success-of-the-migrant-offshore-aid-
station-moas/ [https://perma.cc/DA97-UJH7]. The Rescue Coordination Centers are government-
operated search and rescue facilities created as a result of the ICMSR. Parties to the ICMSR commit-
ted to establish rescue coordination centers and sub-centers. Each center is required to have "adequate
means for the receipt of distress communications via a coast radio station or otherwise." ICMSR,
supra notel07, at annex § 2.3.3.
141 Refugee Convention art. 33, supra note 127 (prohibiting the refoulement of refugees to places
where their lives or freedom would be threatened).
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refusing to allow disembarkation in such situations. 142 The organization does
not indicate what it would do, or whether it has ever faced a dilemma of this
kind. 143 Ultimately, the clash of deeply held goals, "manageable migration sys-
tem[s]", and human rights144 creates legal uncertainty for private humanitarian
actors.
Individuals and NGOs play an important role in saving the lives of asy-
lum seekers travelling in international lands and waters, but their work inher-
ently depends on government cooperation and remains vulnerable to legal
scrutiny. NGOs operate with greater clarity when they emphasize the limited
goal of saving lives rather than advocating for the broader rights of refugees
and migrants or any particular durable solution. 145 The ultimate question of the
rights of refugees and migrants, however, cannot be avoided completely, and
private humanitarian aid in the absence of government cooperation is incom-
plete or ineffective. Thus, even a seemingly benign form of aid-like saving
lives in the ocean-carries risks for private humanitarian actors. 146
D. Entry
Smugglers have a pivotal role at the point of entry into an asylum state.
Anecdotes abound of Syrians who have hired smugglers to procure fake pass-
ports to facilitate travel to northern EU asylum states." In one harrowing in-
stance, a smuggler hid seventy-one refugees and migrants in a truck to
transport them through Hungary to Austria, but all seventy-one refugees and
migrants suffocated, their bodies discovered in Austria too late. 148 Smugglers
also routinely pack sixty people in a boat designed to carry a dozen. 149
142 GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 460.
143 These are not theoretical dilemmas. In 2001, the M/V Tampa, a Norwegian commercial vessel,
sought to land at an Australian port after rescuing 438 asylum seekers. The Australian government
refused to permit entry to Australian waters and a crisis ensued. In August 2001, at the request of
Australian authorities, the Tampa saved 433 people from a sinking vessel off the coast of Indonesia.
Initially headed to Indonesia, the captain was forced to change course for Christmas Island after sev-
eral migrants threatened to commit suicide if the ship continued on to Indonesia. Despite their
knowledge of the urgent medical situation on board, Australian authorities denied the Tampa's entry
into Australian territorial waters. After two days, during which Australian authorities threatened the
Tampa's captain with people- smuggling charges upon unauthorized entrance, the ship entered Aus-
tralian territorial waters without permission. The Australian military boarded the vessel and provided
medical supplies, but denied disembarkation. Five days later, the migrants were moved to an Australi-
an military vessel and the crew of the Tampa was charged with people- smuggling. Id. at 6.
144 See Martin, supra note 136, at 72.
145 See Solutions, U.N. HIGH COMM'R REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cf8.html
[https://perma.cc/WGA9-8U95].
146 See Basaran, supra note 138, at 384 (discussing "blurr[ed] boundaries between criminal and
humanitarian conduct" under international agreements).
147 See infra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.148 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Migrant Suffocations in Truck Near Hungary Reveal Tactics of
Smugglers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19,2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/20/world/europe/migrant-
[Vol. 58:1225
Asylum Seekers and Private Humanitarian Aid
Some of these private actors seek profits. With refugees and migrants
willing to pay $1,200 for transport of an adult and $600 for each child, smug-
glers can collectively amass millions of dollars a day, unmonitored. 150 Syrian
refugees and migrants reputedly are more selective with respect to smugglers,
as they have more money and are willing to pay higher prices for more ac-
ceptable conditions 1 Thus, the huge flight out of Syria has proved particular-
ly profitable for smugglers.
In contrast, some private actors serve refugees and migrants purely out of
humanitarian concern, or even out of a sense of solidarity. For example, Hungar-
ians have volunteered to drive refugees and migrants to the Austrian border from
locations in southern Hungary bordering Serbia and Croatia, despite new laws
that criminalize such aid. 152 Unlike smugglers or traffickers, these individuals
offer to transport refugees and migrants for free, even though free assistance is
often illegal. 153 At least one such volunteer indicated that his own family mem-
bers were Jewish refugees, and he felt he could not ignore the plight of Syrians
escaping both Daesh and Assad. 154 The law, however, restricts many forms of
private aid at this juncture without regard to humanitarian motives.
E. Aid in the Asylum State
The final place of aid in the continuum is the asylum state itself, where
private actors administer aid to asylum seekers who have effectuated an (often
surreptitious) entry. 155 For example, private individuals might house refugee
families, in keeping with the Pope's exhortation.156 Or they might provide
food, language training, or other services to refugee families. 157 In Germany,
suffocations-in-truck-near-hungary-reveal-tactics-of-smugglers.html? r=-0 [https://perma.cc/K4R5-
L49J]. Recently, and in a similar vein, nine migrants died from severe heat exposure and asphyxiation
after being left in a locked tractor-trailer for twelve hours in Texas. David Montgomery et al., Journey
Fatal for 9 Migrants Found in Truck in a San Antonio Parking Lot, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/23/us/san-antonio-truck-walmart-trafficking.htm?mcubz=0
[https://perma.cc/4ZAT- 3BHR].
149 Videmgek, supra note 78.
150 id.
151 See id.





155 Typically, asylum seekers must enter an asylum state "irregularly" because no country current-
ly has an asylum visa. See Ray, supra note 48, at 1246.
156 See Faiola & Birnbaum, supra note 54.
157 Lucy Westcott, Iceland, U.S. Facebook Groups See Outpouring of Humanity for Syrian Refu-
gees, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 5, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/iceland-and-us-facebook-groups-see-
outpouring-humanity-syrian-refugees-368934 [https://perma.cc/NQ2S-WKJ4] (describing outpouring
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private individuals seek to assist refugees in a variety of ways. An elderly
woman wished to read to refugee children, others donated toys at the church,
and students at the University of Siegen organized daily language classes for
asylum seekers staying in the university gymnasium pending the processing of
their applications. 151 In the United States, private humanitarian aid within the
asylum state has occurred primarily in the Southwest, where asylum seekers
enter from Mexico. For example, a humanitarian group, Humane Borders, left
water jugs out along migrant trails in an effort to stem the tide of border-
crossing deaths in the southern Arizona desert. 159 U.S. NGOs, however, have
also taken the lead in finding novel approaches to linking "ordinary individu-
als" to asylum seekers in need outside of U.S. borders. For example, a U.S.
mother, seeing footage of Syrian parents holding their toddlers on long treks
from Greece to northern Europe, concluded that these parents could benefit
from baby carriers to lessen their load and free their hands. 160 Within the first
month of operation, her organization received over 3,000 baby carriers to do-
nate. 
16 1
Private humanitarian aid may also take the form of assisting asylum seek-
ers on a journey within the asylum state, and this may violate laws regarding
the transport of unauthorized migrants within the jurisdiction. 162 Groups like
Samaritans and No More Deaths transported migrants to medical clinics when
necessary, such as when migrants had fainted or had bloody limbs and were
unable to walk. 16' The NGOs contend these individuals would have died in the
desert absent aid. 164 The federal government responded, however, by prosecut-
ing these NGO volunteers for transporting unlawful migrants in violation of
federal anti-smuggling law. 165
The American Sanctuary Movement ("Sanctuary Movement") is the quin-
tessential example of private aid in the asylum state that the government con-
sidered illegal.166 In the 1980s and 1990s, countless religious humanitarian
of goodwill toward refugees). An Icelandic politics professor acknowledges, however, that "support
on Facebook doesn't amount to much." Id.
158 Martin Knobbe et al., supra note 55.159 Maria Lorena Cook, "Humanitarian Aid Is Never a Crime ": Humanitarianism and Illegality
in Migrant Advocacy, 45 L. & Soc'Y REv. 561, 561-62 (2011). U.S. Fish & Wildlife fined them for
littering. Id. But see United States v. Millis, 621 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing conviction
after finding "the term 'garbage' within the context of the regulation.., sufficiently ambiguous" to
apply the rule of lenity).
160 CARRY THE FUTURE, http://www.carrythefuture.org/ [https://perma.cc/KPL4-7TQV].
161 Who We Are, CARRY THE FUTURE, http://www.carrythefuture.org/whoweare/ [https://perma.
cc/YA2F-3JY4].
162 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (prohibiting transport of aliens insofar as transport
furthers their smuggling).
163 Cook, supra note 159, at 574.
164 See id.
165 Id. at 562.
166 Loken & Babino, supra note 38, at 123.
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workers assisted Central Americans fleeing violence in their home countries. 
167
Sanctuary workers believed they had a moral responsibility to aid asylum
seekers because many sanctuary workers subscribed to religious traditions,
such as liberation theology, that require adherents to actively combat social
injustice. 168 Some sanctuary workers provided aid in transporting refugees to
other places in the United States or Canada. Others merely provided a place to
stay so that the particular asylum seekers they encountered would not become
homeless. 169
Founded by Jim Corbett, a Quaker rancher in Arizona, the Sanctuary
Movement arose out of a belief that U.S. policies of funding and training brutal
regimes in Central America contributed to the instability and violence that
drove asylum seekers to U.S. territory in the first place. 170 Sanctuary workers
believed not only that U.S. policy drove mass migrations, but that the U.S.
government's treatment of asylum seekers who had arrived in the U.S. violated
international human rights law.1 1 Specifically, many Central Americans sought
asylum, but U.S. asylum law recognized only a small proportion of claims
filed. 172 This followed principally from U.S. asylum law's requirement that
persecution occur on account of the asylum seeker's political opinion or other
protected characteristics rather than as a result of generalized violence. 
1 3 Cor-
167 
MARIA CRISTINA GARCIA, SEEKING REFUGE: CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRATION TO MEXICO,
THE UNITED STATES, AND CANADA 98 (2006) (describing origins of the Sanctuary Movement in
America).
168 IGNATIUS BAU, THIS GROUND Is HOLY 14 (1985) (noting the impact of liberation theology on
the world's churches); Susan Bibler Coutin, The Oppressed, the Suspect, and the Citizen: Subjectivity
in Competing Accounts of Political Violence, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 63, 67 (2001).
169 See Loken & Babino, supra note 38, at 129.
170Id. at 130; see also Coutin, supra note 168, at 68 (noting "solidarity workers" believed Salva-
doran and Guatemalan migrants were "political refugees" because of the repressive governments in
their home countries).
171 GARCIA, supra note 167, at 98 (describing the Sanctuary Movement as a "grassroots re-
sistance movement that protested US foreign policy through the harboring and transporting of refu-
gees, in violation of immigration law"); see also id. at 100 (noting that some "sanctuary workers"
aimed to conceal refugees in anticipation of a shift in U.S. foreign policy, or until the situation in the
refugees' home countries improved and they could return safely).
172 Id. at 85 (describing "small fraction" of successful asylum applicants among Central Ameri-
cans who fled their home countries to Mexico or the United States); id. at 87 (noting that most Central
American migrants were not eligible for asylum in the United States after the 1980 Refugee Act was
passed).
173 See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A) (2012) (defining "refugee");
see also Susan Bibler Coutin, Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American Asylum
Seekers, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 569, 573 (2011) (discussing asylum law's purpose of addressing ex-
ceptional cases in which a person flees their country of citizenship because the country failed to pro-
vide and protect basic human rights, and noting that these "exceptional" cases have "become all too
common"). Corbett and others, however, maintained that Central American asylum seekers were refu-
gees under the 1949 Geneva Convention because they were driven from their homes due to war. See
Jim Corbett, Sanctuary, Basic Rights, and Humanity's Fault Lines: A Personal Essay, 5 WEBER
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bett and others believed that Central American refugees may not have been
individually targeted in all instances, but that they were entitled to protection
under the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War. 174 Although the U.S. government dismissed Central American
asylum seekers as "economic migrants," sanctuary workers regarded them as
Geneva Convention "refugees."175
According to sanctuary workers, U.S. government officials were the ones
violating international human rights law. The sanctuary workers' decision to
follow international human rights law and violate U.S. government policy was
the truly legal path forward. 176 Many sanctuary workers sought to transport
Central American migrants to Canada, where the migrants would be more like-
ly to win asylum. 177 Although individuals and NGOs openly defied federal law
in the name of a higher law-international human rights law, or "God's law"-
they also sought to change the law, or the prevailing interpretation of it, to
make their actions legal.17' Although some participants in the Sanctuary
Movement believed they were opposing unjust laws as a form of "civil disobe-
dience," others believed their humanitarian work was a form of "civil initia-
tive," or more foundational social justice work. 179 Corbett, in particular, disa-
vowed the label "civil disobedience," noting that sanctuary was premised on
"civil initiative." "0 The concept connotes the preservation of civil society, not
the pursuit of revolution; the use and adherence to law, not the resort to vio-
lence; direct humanitarian service, not political agitation and reform. 8
The federal government, however, dismissed the Sanctuary Movement as
the work of individuals and organizations that believed they were above the
STUD. 1 (1988), https://weberstudies.weber.edu/archive/archive%20A%20%2OVol.%201-10.3/Vol.%
205.1/5.lCorbet.htm [https://perma.cc/FA29-393B].
174 Corbett, supra note 173; see also Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949., INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/380 [https://perma.cc/7ZPD-4H6F].
175 Corbett, supra note 173.
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 Cook, supra note 159, at 575-76.
179 GARCIA, supra note 167, at 102. One scholar has described civil disobedience as "public vio-
lation of a bad law" and civil initiative as centering around "the structural processes that condone and
prolong injustice by attempting to protect the victims of governmental violations of fundamental
rights." ILSUP AHN, RELIGIOUS ETHICS AND MIGRATION: DOING JUSTICE TO UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS 55 (2014). This scholar further noted that civil disobedience is understood within a liability
framework, while civil initiative occurs within a "social connectedness" framework. Id.
180 See Corbett, supra note 173.
181 Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the Politics of Citizen Inter-
pretation, 62 TENN. L. REv. 899, 970-73 (1995) (describing characteristics of civil initiative and
contrasting them to civil disobedience).
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law.18 2 It responded by prosecuting sanctuary workers for "harboring" or
"transporting" unauthorized migrants. 183 The first prosecutions of sanctuary
workers in the early 1980s resulted from undercover work by the former Im-
migration and Naturalization Service in what was known as "Operation So-
journer."'184 The operation deployed investigators and paid informants who
posed as church volunteers. 115 The informants gathered one hundred tape re-
cordings over ten months, culminating in the Justice Department decision to
charge sixteen sanctuary workers,18 6 including Corbett and Pastor John Fife,
often regarded as another founder of the movement. 187
As these prosecutions progressed in federal court, the government and e-
fenders of the sanctuary workers contested the legality of the movement's
work. Defenders claimed that the Refugee Convention, incorporated into U.S.
law via the 1980 Refugee Act, implicitly authorized private humanitarian aid
to refugees, regardless of their unauthorized entry into the United States. 188
They further argued that sanctuary workers had First Amendment rights to
Free Exercise of Religion that authorized their humanitarian acts toward refu-
gees.189 These defenses largely failed, and courts concluded that providing
food, shelter, and comfort to unauthorized migrants, including individuals
whom the government might ultimately recognize as refugees, violated the
anti-smuggling statute.1 90
A final and more fantastical example of aid in the asylum state is the pro-
posal to create a new country to house refugees. Naguib Sawiris, an Egyptian
billionaire, was so moved by Alan Kurdi's death that he contacted the owners
of two private islands near Greece with the plan to purchase one of the islands
to house refugees.1 91 Committing $200 million to the project, Sawiris proposed
buying an island to avoid creating competition between refugees and "1o-
182 See GARCIA, supra note 167, at 103, 106 (describing the Reagan administration's Justice De-
partment memorandum warning "clergy and church workers [that they] were not exempt from prose-
cution," and Operation Sojourner, through which the FBI infiltrated church sanctuary sites, leading to
the arrest of over eighty individuals, "including refugees and church workers who had transported
them," for "conspiracy and transporting/harboring illegal aliens").
183 See Loken & Babino, supra note 38, at 129-30.
184 Helton, supra note 32, at 556-57.
185 id.
186 GARCIA, supra note 167, at 106.
187 Id.
188 Helton, supra note 32, at 561. Article 31 of the Convention Relation to the Status of Refugees
also prohibits parties from penalizing refugees for their irregular entry. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees art. 31, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
189 Helton, supra note 32, at 576-78.
190 See id.; see also infra notes 246-258 and accompanying text.
191 Nolan Feeney, Egyptian Billionaire Contacts Owners to Buy an Island for Refugees, TIME
(Sept. 16, 2015), http://time.com/4036044/egyptian-billionaire-refugees-greek-island/ [http://perma.
cc/NC4N-RT65].
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cals." 192 Similarly, businessman Jason Buzi proposed creating a "refugee na-
tion," and experts have taken the idea seriously. 193
All of these examples of private aid are voluntary, charitable projects that
advance humanitarian ends. As discussed above, however, the law frequently
outlaws private humanitarian aid, especially at points of rescue, entry into the
asylum state, and assistance therein, because powerful asylum states' interests
in sovereignty peak at these points in an asylum seeker's journey.
II. STATES' INTERESTS IN CRIMINALIZING PRIVATE HUMANITARIAN
AID TO ASYLUM SEEKERS
All of the instances of private humanitarian aid described in Part I illustrate
the groundswell of goodwill toward asylum seekers, 194 but the law frequently
frustrates this intense desire to provide humanitarian assistance. For example,
U.S. law criminalizes the transport of smuggled aliens, which might encompass
acts as innocuous as giving a ride within the country to anyone without a valid
visa. 195 Even acts of rescue on the high seas, mandated under international mari-
time law, might result in prosecution if coupled with transport to an asylum
state's territory. 196 What interests motivate laws criminalizing private humanitar-
ian acts to aid asylum seekers? This Part analyzes the principal interests underly-
ing legal restrictions on private humanitarian aid. It identifies three principal in-
terests: national security, crime control, and economic preservation. 197 It further
192 Hannah Roberts, Will One of These Be 'Aylan's Island'? As Egyptian Billionaire Refuses to
Name Greek Isle He Plans to Turn into Home for 200,000 Refugees, Experts Reveal Most Likely
Ones, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3247948/Will-one-
Aylan-s-Island-Egyptian-billionaire-refuses-Greek-island-plans-turn-home-200-000-refugees-experts-
reveal-likely-ones.html [http://perma.cc/8AL3-5H3B].
193 Alexander Betts, Is Creating a New Nation for the World's Refugees a Good Idea?, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 4,2015), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/
2015/aug/04/refugee-nation-migration-jason-buzi [https://perma.cc/S8GB-TJRT] (describing ad-
vantages and isadvantages of Buzi's proposal).
194 Animus toward refugees also rose following the Paris attacks, but analyzing its role in migra-
tion policy is beyond the scope of this Article.
195 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012); United States v. Barajas-Chavez, 162 F.3d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir.,
1999); Frayer, supra note 152.
196 See Stefan Steinberg, Prosecuted for Saving the Lives of Refugees, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB
SITE (Oct. 9,2009), https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2009/10/cape-o09.html [https://perma.cc/45E2-
HM4M].
197 See Alexander Betts, The Normative Terrain of the Global Refugee Regime, ETHICS & INT'L
AFF. (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2015/the-normative-terrain-of-the-
global-refugee-regime/ [https://perma.cc/4BTN-YXVJ] (describing states' perception of "economic,
social, and political costs" of accepting refugees). Interests such as social cohesion and political stabil-
ity also influence a state's desire to restrict migration, but they are not specifically interests that lead to
restrictions on private aid to refugees. For example, smuggling is not outlawed because the govern-
ment fears that people will import refugees of a minority culture who will then have trouble integrat-
ing into mainstream culture. It is, however, outlawed due to fears of terrorism, crime, and economic
consequences.
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considers whether private humanitarian aid serves to "pull" more refugees and
migrants into embarking on perilous journeys by creating a hope or expectation
of rescue, and whether private humanitarian aid crowds out government re-
sources devoted to humanitarian assistance.
A. Security- and Money-Based Interests
Criminal laws in the United States, Canada, and the European Union, ap-
plicable to private humanitarian actors assisting asylum seekers, reveal con-
cerns about terrorism, crime, and economic preservation, both in terms ofjobs
and public spending. These considerations underlie government policies to
exclude unauthorized migrants. These laws typically prohibit any person from
assisting an unauthorized migrant in entering the territory of the asylum state.
These laws also prohibit individuals from transporting, harboring, concealing,
or shielding from detection any unauthorized migrant who has already entered
the territory. 198 These are essentially the same considerations that drive the
criminal prohibitions on unauthorized entry into these states.
1. Asylum Seekers as Threats to National Security and Sources of Crime
The first and most significant interest in justifying limits on private aid to
asylum seekers is national security. 199 U.S. Presidents and Congress have used
the term "national security" to refer to a range of concepts, such as the Ameri-
can constitutional system of government, U.S. economic interests, and the
American "way of life., 20 0 Immigration law defines the term as "the national
defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States."2 1 One
of the principal functions of government under U.S. immigration law today is
to screen incoming refugees and migrants for preferred characteristics.202 With
this premise, accepting open borders or migration based on the private choice
of current citizens or residents would render a nation vulnerable to security
203threats because such scenarios bypass the government screening process.
198 See infra notes 215-262 and accompanying text.
199 See Jennifer M. Chac6n, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1827, 1830 (2007).
200 Arthur Rizer & Sheri R. Glaser, Breach: The National Security Implications of Human Traf-
ficking, 17 WIDENER L. REv. 69, 73-75 (2011).
201 Id. at 74.
202 See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59
STAN. L. REv. 809, 824-25 (2007).
203 See id.
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Unscreened refugees and migrants entering a host state might commit an act of
terrorism that harms people or the asylum state's interests. 2
0 4
Refugees are often the lightning rod for these national security concerns.
For example, Paris suffered three heinous terrorist attacks in one evening, all
perpetrated by Daesh.2 o5 Although none of the attackers was a refugee, politi-
cians characterized the attack as the product of an overly generous refugee pol-
icy. 206 This, in turn, caused dozens of American governors to call for curtailing
the United States' refugee resettlement program, at least with respect o Syri-
ans. 207 The governor of Texas even directed NGOs doing resettlement work to
cease all aid to Syrian refugees.208 Although these state-level restrictions raise
unique legal issues and are likely unconstitutional,2 9 they reflect the general
approach of banning private humanitarian aid to refugees in the name of na-
tional security.
Crime control is a related concern, and scholars have noted the frequent
conflation of immigration enforcement, national security, and crime control.210
Politicians and public figures have frequently linked higher rates of unauthor-
ized immigration with higher rates of crime, and an individual's unauthorized
migration with a greater propensity for law breaking generally. These asser-
tions lack empirical support.21 Border control agents, however, have reported
significant rates of illegal entry by gang members, thus stoking fears of the
,.common criminal who enter[s] the United States illegally," regarding the
United States "'as fertile ground for violence.' 212 Politicians have singled out
refugees specifically as security threats.213 To the extent that private humani-
204 See, e.g., Andrea Shalal, Syrian Refugee in Germany Arrested After Killing Woman in Ma-
chete Attack, REUTERS (July 25, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-attacks-germany-
migrant-idUSKCN1040SF [https://perma.cc/3VR9-4N7T].205 ParisAttacks: What Happened on the Night, BBC (Dec. 9,2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-34818994 [https://perma.cc/X5MS-6L7J].
206 Anton Troianovski & Marcus Walker, Paris TerrorAttacks Transform Debate over Europe's
Migration Crisis, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2015, at A10.
207 See Arnie Seipel, More Than 30 Governors Callfor Halt to U.S. Resettlement of Syrian Refu-
gees, NPR (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/11/17/456336432/more-governors-oppose-u-s-
resettlement-of-syrian-refugees [https://perma.cc/6ET9-4ZZ].
208 Lauren Talarico, Nonprofits Told Not to Help Syrian Refugees, KHOU (Nov. 20, 2015),
http://www.khou.com/story/news/local/2015/11/20/nonprofits-asked-not-to-help-syrian-refugees/
76134346/ [https://perma.cc/Y5PJ-YCR3].
209 Andre Segura & Cody Wofsy, Governors' Threats to Exclude Syrian Refugees Are Not Only
FearMongering-They're Unconstitutional, AM. CrvLLE3RTFS UNION (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.
aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/governors-threats-exclude-syrian-refugees-are-not-only- fear-mongering-
theyre [https://perma.cc/DP9R-R5L].
210 Chac6n, supra note 199, at 1831.
211 Id. at 1839-40.
212 Rizer & Glaser, supra note 200, at 83.
213 Jenna Johnson & Sean Sullivan, Why Trump Warned About Somali Refugees-And Why It
Could Backfire (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/11/07/
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tarian aid to asylum seekers bypasses the government screening process prior
to their arrival, it stands to frustrate security-related objectives.214
a. U.S. Law
Security-related concerns drive some legal restrictions on private humani-
tarian aid. For example, federal law proscribes the knowing provision of "ma-
terial support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations.215
Donors have been prosecuted for supporting nonprofits that are designated
216Foreign Terrorist Organizations ("FTOs"). Thus, even aid in the country of
origin, which does not implicate irregular migration and has the goal of keep-
ing displaced persons at home, may violate criminal prohibitions, in addition to
incurring the inherent safety risks discussed in Part I.
Federal criminal law reflects concerns for national security and crime con-
trol, as well as protection from "economic migrants." Federal law prohibits hu-
man trafficking, which Congress has characterized as a "contemporary manifes-
tation of slavery." 217 The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 ("TVPA")
criminalizes human trafficking and seeks to protect victims of trafficking.2 18
Specifically, the portion of the TVPA codified in 18 U.S.C. section 1590 crim-
inalizes the harboring or transport of "any person for labor or services" in vio-
lation of the statute. 219 Victims and perpetrators of trafficking are often irregu-
lar migrants.2 20 Commentators have posited that irregular migration itself
threatens national security. Thus, to the extent that anti-trafficking laws attempt
to curb irregular migration, they protect interests in national security and crime
control.221
Scholars have argued that this conflation of irregular migration with crim-
inality has imposed a variety of costs on migrants, including asylum seekers
why-trump-warned-about- somali-refugees-and-why-it-could-backfire/?utm term=.b6d2ac 19b24f
[https://perma.cc/GV38-QVGN].
214 See Cox & Posner, supra note 202, at 812 (discussing immigration law's screening function).
215 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012); see also Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: The Precarious
Status of Non-Citizen Speech Under the First Amendment, 57 B.C. L. REv. 1237, 1281 (2016) (dis-
cussing constitutionality of section 2339B).
216 See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 (2010) (upholding federal law
prohibiting material support o FTOs).
217 Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102, 114 Stat. 1464, 1466
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7101).
218 See Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102, 114 Stat. 1464, 1466; Current Federal Laws, POLARIS,
https://polarisproject.org/current- federal-laws [https://perma.cc/7R4U-8U9M].
219 18 U.S.C. § 1590(a).
220 Jennifer M. Chac6n, Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in the Era of
Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 1609, 1629 (2010).
221 Rizer & Glaser, supra note 200, at 82-85 (discussing the premise that any illegal entry into the
United States triggers national security concerns).
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and other vulnerable migrants. 22 The view that irregular migration itself is a
crime that threatens U.S. interests, for example, has led U.S. anti-trafficking
law to emphasize the prosecution of "bad actors" at the expense of a more
complete, accurate understanding of the causes of trafficking and the nature of
markets that traffickers supply.22' By constructing trafficking as a problem
"that is the sole responsibility of noncitizens and outsiders," U.S. anti-
trafficking discourse further criminalizes trafficked migrants, who themselves
are often undocumented.224 Thus, although the law views unauthorized migra-
tion as a source of criminal behavior in the asylum state,225 undocumented sta-
tus itself drives this perception of criminality.226
Federal criminal law also prohibits "alien smuggling, domestic transpor-
tation of unauthorized aliens, [and] concealing or harboring unauthorized al-
iens," among other offenses.2 2 Commentators have indicated that the anti-
smuggling statute was designed simply to exclude or remove unauthorized al-
iens from the United States.228 The statute creating criminal penalties for these
offenses was originally passed as part of the Immigration and Nationality
Act229 and was primarily concerned with regulating people who interacted with
single Mexican men lacking familial ties to the United States.230 Congress
struggled to define the crime of "harboring" and assumed that, much like the
lawmakers of other countries, decisionmakers would be able to evaluate each
situation and "assign culpability based on [that] assessment.2 31 Congress
passed the final version of the bill without defining "harboring," and questions
remained about whether and under what circumstances the knowing provision212
of assistance to an unlawful alien would be prohibited. This failure to define
"harboring" led federal courts to interpret the statute in different ways. Initial-
222 See Chac6n, supra note 199, at 1835-39.
223 Chac6n, supra note 220, at 1628, 1631-32.
224 Id. at 1634.
225 See Chac6n, supra note 199, at 1839-40.
226 Chac6n, supra note 220, at 1627-28.
227 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2012); U.S. DEP'T JUST., CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 1901-1999
§ 1907, http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1907-title-8-usc-1324a-offenses
[https://perma.cc/B8HH-25NW].
228 See Matthew F. Leitman & Paul D. Hudson, Defending Employers When ICE Puts the Heat
On, CHAMPION MAG., Jan.-Feb. 2012, at 48 (citing United States v. Acosta de Evans, 531 F. 2d 428
(9th Cir. 1976)).
229 Bau, supra note 168, at 93-94 (describing Congress's decision to adopt criminal penalties for
harboring and related offenses in 1952 after the Supreme Court found earlier penalties for those of-
fenses ambiguous).
230 Jain, supra note 30, at 160.
231 Id. at 165.
2321Id. Canada's anti-smuggling law applied with similar breadth, leading the Canadian Supreme
Court in 2015 to strike down the law due to its failure to exempt humanitarian actors. The court noted
that Parliament never intended for the law to apply to such actors in the first place. SeeAppulonappa,
3 S.C.R. 39, 69.
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ly, courts focused on defendants' intention to conceal aliens from immigration
authorities, but later courts expanded the statute to cover any conduct "sub-
233stantially facilitating" an alien's unlawful presence within the territory.
This expansive interpretation effectively criminalizes many everyday in-
teractions with unauthorized migrants, such as sharing meals or offering a
234place to stay, with no exception for humanitarian assistance. For example,
the statute has ensnared U.S. NGOs providing humanitarian aid near the border
with Mexico. Volunteers with a group called No More Deaths were prosecuted
for transporting migrants in need of medical care from the Arizona desert to
235hospitals or clinics in Tucson. By performing medical evacuations, the vol-
unteers had technically "transport[ed] aliens" in violation of federal law.236
Although the charges were ultimately dropped, No More Deaths continues to
face Customs and Border Protection's scrutiny, culminating in a 2017 raid of a
desert campsite medical clinic. 23 American sanctuary workers faced a similar
fate decades ago.238 Thus, anti-smuggling laws have criminalized acts of pri-
vate humanitarian aid. 239
b. International, EU, and Canadian Law
Several international instruments also address muggling and trafficking.
Although they frame unlawful migration as a matter of international criminal
law, they explicitly recognize an exception for humanitarian acts. The United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, drafted in 2000, is240
the foundational instrument. Its ProtocolAgainst the Smuggling of Migrants
by Land, Sea, andAir defines the "smuggling of migrants" to involve the "pro-
curement.., of the illegal entry" of a person, who is neither a citizen nor a
permanent resident of the country entered, for direct or indirect "financial or
233 Jain, supra note 30, at 166, 169.
234 Id. at 176 (discussing court's observation, in a harboring case, that "a host of commonplace
interactions could arguably help an unauthorized alien remain in the United States").
235 Cook, supra note 159, at 562.
236 id.
237 Id. at 574-75; Eric Boodman, After Trump's Immigration Crackdown, a Desert Clinic Tries to
Save Lives Without Breaking the Law, STAT NEWS (July 6, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/
07/06/immigration-desert-clinic/ [https://perma.cc/K9DP-JSTX] (describing the Trump Administra-
tion' s aggressive stance toward NGOs providing humanitarian aid to migrants in the southwest United
States).
238 GARCIA, supra note 167, at 106.
239 See Jain, supra note 30, at 171-74. State governments have led more recent efforts to outlaw
sanctuary. See Campbell, supra note 38, at 81. Such criminalization has a much longer history. See
GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMEN
TAL LAW 19-43 (2003) (describing state and federal efforts to limit migration of criminals, the sick,
the poor, and slaves in the nineteenth century).
240 G.A. Res. 55/25, United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Nov.
15, 2000).
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other material benefit., 241 By limiting the definition to smuggling for "finan-
cial or... material benefit," the Migrant Smuggling Protocol expressly ex-
cludes humanitarian smuggling from the ambit of criminal law. 242
In light of these international instruments, the European Union adopted
several measures regarding smuggling. In 2002, the European Union adopted a
directive on the "facilitation of unauthori[z]ed entry, transit and residence" and
a Framework Decision on strengthening criminal laws on the same.243 The Fa-
cilitation Directive applies broadly to "any person who intentionally assists [a
non-citizen] ... to enter, or transit across, the territory of a Member State" in
breach of that state's migration laws.244 Although the Framework Decision
contains a "savings clause" to avoid prejudicing the rights of refugees and asy-
lum seekers under international law, it does not define smuggling as narrowly
as the Migrant Smuggling Protocol.245 As such, the Facilitation Directive and
Framework Decision contain an expansive definition of smuggling.
The European Union's anti-smuggling laws have complicated the work of
European NGOs saving lives on the Mediterranean. NGOs such as Sea-Watch
note the legal uncertainty created by these laws, whereby humanitarian organi-
zations can become the targets of prosecution for assisting refugees and mi-
grants in distress if those refugees and migrants are brought to shore.24 6 Back
241 Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 3.
242 Abdelnaser Aljehani, The Legal Definition of the Smuggling ofMigrants in Light of the Provi-
sions of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, 79 J. CRIM. L. 122, 127 (2015). Importantly, this means
only that the Migrant Smuggling Protocol imposes no obligations on states to criminalize humanitari-
an smuggling, but it does not preclude them from doing so.
243 GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 91; see Directive 2002/90/EC, of the Council of the
European Union of 28 November 2002 on Defining the Facilitation of Unauthorised Entry, Transit
and Residence, 2002 O.J. (L 328/17) [hereinafter Facilitation Directive] (defining punishable offenses
of entry and transit without reference to financial or material benefit); Framework Decision
2002/946/JHA, of the Council of the European Union of 28 November 2002 on the Strengthening of
the Penal Framework to Prevent the Facilitation of Unauthorized Entry, Transit and Residence, 2002
O.J. (L 328/1) [hereinafter Framework Decision] (same).
244 Facilitation Directive, supra note 243. Article 1.2 of the Facilitation Directive contains an
optional clause permitting states to decriminalize humanitarian facilitation of illegal entry and transit,
but most states have chosen to adopt the broad definition of entry and transit in Article 1.1 (a), without
an exception for humanitarian assistance. Id. at art. 1.2; see EUR. UNION AGENCY FUNDAMENTAL
RTs., CRIMINALISATION OF MIGRANTS IN AN IRREGULAR SITUATION AND OF PERSONS ENGAGING
WITH THEM 9-10 (Mar. 2014), http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2014/criminalisation-migrants-
irregular- situation-and-persons-engaging-them [https://perma.cc/9YCC-QN72] (noting that most EU
states do not require proof of financial gain to punish facilitation of entry, but rather view financial
gain as an aggravating factor). Both the Facilitation Directive and the Framework Decision require
states to criminalize facilitation of residence only when done for "financial gain," but states remain
free to criminalize facilitation of residence without a financial gain requirement.
245 GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 91; see Framework Decision, supra note 243, at art. 6
(savings clause).246 See GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 91-92; Anti-Smuggling Legislation andMigrant
Rights, HUM. RTS. AT SEA (May 26, 2015), https://hras-seawatch.org/2015/05/26/anti-smuggling-
legislation-and-migrant-rights/ [https://perma.cc/Q4QS-9BNR].
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in 2004, Italy prosecuted Cap Anamur, an NGO that docked at an Italian port
without authorization. 247 The ship carried refugees and migrants from Ghana
and Nigeria who had been rescued at sea.24' In executing the duty to rescue
under international maritime law, the captain of Cap Anamur sought to bring
the refugees and migrants to a "safe place.,249 No such safe place, however,
consented to the docking. 250 After a two-week standoff with Italian authorities,
251the captain docked the ship without authorization. Italy prosecuted the res-
cuers with the crime of "aiding illegal migration.252 Five years later, the de-
fendants were acquitted.253 The court ruled that the master of the ship could not
254be liable for rescue because international law mandated such rescue. More-
over, the master of the ship was not liable for bringing the refugees and mi-
grants to the Italian coast without authorization because the duty to rescue,
under international maritime law, includes the transport of those in danger to a
"place of safety.,255 Scholars have argued that this "arguably extends the man-
tle of what constitutes a 'rescue operation' up until the point of disembarka-
tion, whether this is on to land or some other suitable facility.,25 On this view,
merely holding rescued persons on the rescuer's vessel does not discharge the
duty owed.25 Although scholars contend that a finding of criminal liability
under such circumstances would result in "manifest injustice," governments
continue to regard with suspicion the transport of rescued refugees and mi-
251grants to their territory for processing.
For many years, Canadian law echoed these themes, and historically, the
Canadian government has responded to asylum seekers' unauthorized travel by
prosecuting the private actors who organized the journey to Canada, whether for
247 GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 462.
248 Rupert Colville, Handling of Cap Anamur Asylum Claims Was Flawed, Says UNHCR, U.N.
HIGH COMM'R REFUGEES (July 23, 2004), http://www.unhcr.org/4101252e4.html [https://perma.
cc/MWM3-WJS8] (noting that refugees and migrants were ultimately deported to Ghana and Nigeria).
249 See id.
250 GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 462.
251 Colville, supra note 248.
252 GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 462. More recently, Italy acquitted an activist who
assisted migrants in crossing the French border. See Italy Acquits Activist Who HelpedMigrants Cross
French Border, THE LOCAL (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.thelocal.it/20170427/italy-acquits-activist-
who-helped-migrants-cross-french-border [https://perma.cc/HZ3Z-NYCK].
253 GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 462.
254 id.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 463.
257 See id.
258 Id. ("It remains to be seen whether the crew of a rescuing vessel that ... disembarks rescued
persons in breach of instructions from the coastal State, would be able to avoid prosecution under
domestic laws by relying on their obligation to render humanitarian assistance.").
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profit or not.259 The government has also "aggressively]" punished asylum
seekers who assist fellow asylum seekers on the same unauthorized journeys as
them by placing such individuals in inadmissibility proceedings.260 These pro-
ceedings are likely to extinguish their asylum rights permanently. 261 Ultimately,
anti-smuggling legislation in the major Western asylum states generally reveals
little to no concern about potentially criminalizing private humanitarian aid.262
2. Asylum Seekers as Economic Threats
Concerns about the economic impact of asylum seekers on wages and
jobs for existing residents of an asylum state also motivate the prosecution of
humanitarian actors rendering aid to unauthorized migrants, even if those mi-
grants are ultimately recognized as refugees. 263Although some evidence indi-
cates that refugees are, in fact, an economic asset-perhaps due to the "stimu-
264lative effect" on the economy_ the public frequently views them as a liabil-
ity. 265 Restrictionists also imagine refugees requiring massive public support,
266stoking fears that refugees will strain public welfare budgets.. Scholars,
259 Angus Grant, The Smuggled and the Smuggler: Exploring the Distinctions Between MutualAid,
Humanitarian Refugee Assistance and People Smuggling in Canadian Law, REFLAW, http://www.




262 See GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 91 (noting that "[t]he Protocol sets out a straight-
forward definition of migrant smuggling that clearly includes a profit element," while "[t]he Frame-
work Decision and Directive do not... take full account of the profit element"). Compare Migrant
Smuggling Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 3 (defining criminal smuggling more narrowly as "the pro-
curement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal
entry into a State party" of a person who is not a citizen or permanent resident of that state), with 18
U.S.C. § 1324 (2012) (defining without reference to financial or material benefit the punishable of-
fenses of bringing in, transporting, concealing, harboring, or shielding from detection unauthorized
migrants), and Framework Decision, supra note 243, at art. 1 (1) (describing penalties without refer-
ence to "financial gain"), and Appulonappa, 3 S.C.R. 39, 69.
263 See Helton, supra note 32, at 561 (discussing government's justification for prosecuting sanc-
tuary workers based on "the need to maintain a strict immigration policy in order to stem the tide of
undocumented aliens entering the United States as 'economic migrants').
264 Robert J. Shiller, Economists on the Refugee Path, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Jan. 19, 2016),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/conmmentary/economic-research-contribution-to-asylum-reform-by-
robert-j--shiller-2016-01'?barrier=accessreg [https://perma.cc/6JTM-DNW4].
265 See id. (noting that opponents of policies admitting refugees frequently argue that "the new-
comers will take locals' jobs and drive down wages").
266 See Didier Bigo, Criminalization of "Migrants ": The Side Effects of the Will to Control the
Frontiers and the Sovereign Illusion, in IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORETI
CAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 61, 63-64 (Barbara Bogusz et al. eds., 2004)
("Migration of the poor, and of the people obliged to flee from their own country-that is asylum
seekers-is seen as the equivalent of an 'invasion,' based on the idea that people coming that way,
want to settle definitely in the prosperous economies to benefit from the welfare state."); see also
Jacob Poushter, European Opinions of the Refugee Crisis In 5 Charts, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 16,
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however, have noted that the tendency for refugees to become assets or liabili-
ties to the economy depends largely on the policy framework in place in the
267asylum state. For example, in Uganda, where the law grants refugees free-
dom of movement and freedom to work, refugees have contributed positively
to the economy and country as a whole. 26' The notion that refugees are a mon-
olithic group that either benefit or burden a society misses the point that a par-
ticular society's institutions facilitate or stifle refugees' capacity to contrib-
ute. 269
As a historical matter, however, anxiety about he economic effects of ir-
regular migration has been the most significant concern behind calls for stiffer
penalties for alien smuggling and transport, as well as for the creation of new
offenses for harboring and concealment under U.S. law.2  President Harry S.
Truman, in a message to Congress, highlighted the wage depressive effects of
illegal immigration from Mexico, noting also the conditions for exploitation
created when a group works under constant threat of deportation.271 He called
for stricter smuggling and transport prohibitions, as well as punishment for
harboring or concealing immigrants who entered illegally. 2 Noting the diffi-
culty of sealing the entire U.S. land border to unauthorized entry, he concluded
that these criminal laws would serve as tools to locate and process unauthor-
ized migrants and to discourage U.S. citizens from assisting their entry into the
United States.271 Unsurprisingly, the legislative history of the anti-smuggling
law reveals not a single mention of "persecution" or the possible refugee status
of any aliens who enter illegally, for the Refugee Convention had not yet been
drafted, and Central America did not become the site of widespread political
violence and turmoil until the 1980s.2 4 Thus, the subsequent prosecution of
NGOs for assisting asylum seekers was likely never contemplated when the
statute was drafted and passed,2  because Congress was principally concerned
about regulating migrants seeking economic opportunity, not asylum.276
2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/l6/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-
5-charts/ [https://perma.cc/9QRH-5T37].
267 See Betts, supra note 197.
268 Id.
269 See id.
270 See 97 CONG. REc. 82, 8144-46 (1951); cf. Jain, supra note 30, at 160 (describing lawmakers'
view that irregular migrants seek economic opportunity).
271 See 97 CONG. REC. 82, at 8144-46.
272 id.
273 Id. at 8145.
274 Cf Jain, supra note 30, at 169 (discussing legislative history of statute).
275 Id.; see also Bau, supra note 168, at 102 (noting that Congress later considered amending the
statute to specifically require proof of commercial motivation).276 Jain, supra note 30, at 160, 164 ("The debates reflected lawmakers' consensus that unauthor-
ized aliens came to the United States because of the lure of jobs.").
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B. Policy-Based Concerns
Apart from concerns about national security, crime control, and economic
preservation, there are other reasons to limit private humanitarian aid. First,
private humanitarian aid simply may not be the right tool to address the mas-
sive humanitarian crisis facing refugees.2  Only the government can lawfully
establish criteria for screening, meaning that private actors can never fully sub-
stitute for the government in managing migration.27' Further, humanitarian
crises merit a coordinated, appropriately scaled response-another compara-
tive advantage of government solutions.279 This line of thinking presents a
false choice, though, for none of these advantages of government action pre-
cludes meaningful private action in responding to the immediate human eeds
of refugees "in our midst," whether within our borders orjust beyond them. 280
Relying completely on coordinated state action also creates a risk that many
people will go without the help they need.281
Some may also worry that private humanitarian aid serves as a "pull fac-
tor," drawing asylum seekers into perilous journeys with the hope of rescue
and a better life, and that private humanitarian aid will displace government
aid, or create incentives for governments to reduce already-limited support for
282search and rescue operations. These concerns require empirical analysis, but
generally, they appear misplaced. First, asylum seekers and migrants continue
to embark on dangerous journeys quite possibly because most people who un-
dertake them actually survive. Out of 1 million migrants who crossed the Med-
277 Cf. Oliver Cunningham, The Humanitarian Aid Regime in the Republic ofNGOs: The Fallacy
of 'Building Back Better, '4 JOSEPH KORBEL J. ADV. INT'L STUD. 102, 113-14(2012), http://www.du.
edu/korbel/jais/journal/volume4/volume4 cunningham.pdf [https://perna.ccVZ32-3XWP] (discuss-
ing merits of government-based alternative solutions to traditional humanitarian aid under certain
circumstances).
278 See Cox & Posner, supra note 202, at 812 (discussing substantive screening criteria under U.S.
law and more general theoretical insights regarding ex ante and ex post screening performed by the
government).
279 Governments typically have more resources than private actors, including both money and the
equipment necessary to carry out large-scale responses to international crises; governments are the
only actors that have the power to alter international aw; governments are responsible for determining
their own immigration policies and procedures, whereas private actors merely work legally within
those frameworks or illegally outside of them; and governments are not restricted by market forces,
like many private actors, which typically must generate enough revenue to cover their operating costs.
Thus, governments are uniquely positioned to formulate and execute an appropriate response to mass
migrations.
280 See Deborah E. Anker, Discretionary Asylum: A Protection Remedy for Refugees Under the
Refugee Act of 1980, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 1,42 (1998) (noting the "special moral claims of those in our
midst seeking U.S. protection").
281 I thank Martha Minow for raising this point.
282 Leila Osterbo, Who Is Who in the Mediterranean Rescue Scene, MIGRANT REP. (June 20,
2015), http://migrantreport.org/infographic-mediterranean-assets/ [https://perma.cc/PQ8N-6BDC]
(noting UK's opposition to Mare Nostrum based on the view that it served as a "pull factor").
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iterranean without authorization in 2015, ninety-eight percent reached the
shore safety. 283 360,000 migrants uccessfully crossed the Mediterranean and
284roughly 5,000 died on the journey in 2016. Even if several thousand were
rescued out of the population of migrants who undertook the journey, the vast
majority still successfully completed the journey without rescue or humanitari-
an assistance. Thus, it appears empirically rational for migrants to continue to
choose risky dinghy boat passage to Europe because, in fact, most survive.
Second, critics have failed to establish a causal connection between in-
creased private humanitarian assistance and reduced government spending on
search and rescue operations. Indeed, in some instances, the causation is re-
versed. For example, Italy ceased its highly successful, but costly, search and
rescue program, Mare Nostrum in October of 2014.285 Triton, a program that is
largely funded by the European Union, replaced it, but with an emphasis on
border enforcement, instead of search and rescue.286 When deaths at sea
spiked, private actors entered the arena to replace government aid that had
already been eliminated. In addition, political pressure mounted on the Eu-
ropean Union to expand its search and rescue efforts, which resulted in a
"commitment to triple Triton's budget for 2015-16., , 288 Thus, the presence of
multiple NGOs performing search and rescue work has not had a chilling ef-
fect on governments. As a historical matter, the incentives have worked in the
opposite direction, with government retrenchment prompting private humani-
tarian actors to intervene.
Systemic restrictions on such assistance, however, might make sense gen-
erally in light of questions about the sustainability of private charitable inter-
ests and the accountability of private actors. If societies encourage private ac-
tors to provide humanitarian assistance to asylum seekers in need over a longer
time period, what happens if and when private humanitarian actors become
283 See Latest Global Figures, INT'L ORG. MIGRATION: MISSING MIGRANTS PROJECT, http://
missingmigrants.iom.int/latest-global-figures [https://perma.cc/LDP6-X9LB].
284 Ben Quinn, Migrant Death Toll Passes 5, 000 After Two Boats Capsize Off Italy, THE GUARD
IAN (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/23/record-migrant-death-toll-two-
boats-capsize-italy-un-refugee [https://perma.cc/EQ6A-WPXR].285 Sea-Watch Rescue Blog, supra note 52 ("The general opinion in Brussels was that the greater
the rescue capability ... the greater the likelihood more migrants would attempt to enter Europe via
these means.").286 Osterb0, supra note 282; see Glenda Garelli & Martina Tazzioli, The EUHotspotApproach at
Lampedusa, OPENDEMOCRACY (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-
it/glenda-garelli-martina-tazzioli/eu-hotspot-approach-at-lampedusa [https://perma.cc/9DGQ-4B96];
MareNorstrum to End-New Frontex Operation Will Not Ensure Rescue ofMigrants in International
Waters, EUR. COUNCIL REFUGEES & EXILES (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.ecre.org/operation-mare-
nostrum-to-end- frontex-triton-operation-will-not-ensure-rescue-at- sea-of-migrants-in-international-
waters/ [https://perma.cc/3YL6-EWUE].
287 See Osterb0, supra note 282 (identifying dates when MOAS, Sea-Watch, and Norwegian
Society for S&R began their efforts, after Mare Nostrum ended).
288 id.
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exhausted, find that they have taken on more than they can handle, or simply
lose interest?289 Are private desires to assist asylum seekers sufficiently resili-
ent for the task at hand?290 Supporting asylum seekers in the process of apply-
ing for refugee status and then integrating into society is a long-term commit-
ment. The danger of permitting individuals to privately assist refugees of their
choosing is that private interest in those refugees may prove short-lived. 291
Relatedly, questions of accountability arise. How can we trust the quality of
private humanitarian aid when it is decentralized, potentially capricious, and
answers to no one?292 What oversight is required as to the quality of aid pro-
vided? Restrictions on private humanitarian aid might ultimately benefit some
asylum seekers because private smuggling and housing could lead to exploita-
tion, particularly if the asylum seeker lacks a reasonable path to legal status.293
Governments, however, can address many of these concerns through pru-
dent policy choices. For example, governments can educate volunteers and
train them on best search and rescue practices or how best to meet asylum
seekers' needs during the period when their asylum applications are pend-
ing. 294 Through such public-private partnerships, private actors can work to
meet asylum seekers' needs while answering to public standards.295
Ultimately, security, crime control, and economic preservation are all
generally legitimate interests that asylum states invoke to justify restricting
private aid to refugees. To the extent that private aid might lead asylum seekers
to bypass government screening, it creates potential security or crime risks and
facilitates acts, such as smuggling, that are themselves viewed as crimes. Poli-
cy-makers should also consider the potential distortion of incentives that pri-
vate humanitarian aid might cause, both with respect to government commit-
ment to search and rescue and asylum seekers' willingness to risk peril in trav-
elling to the asylum state. In the most recent mass flights from violence, how-
ever, these feared incentive effects do not appear to have materialized.
289 Cf. Tracey M. Derwing & Marlene Mulder, The Kosovar Sponsoring Experience in Northern
Alberta, 4 J. INT'L MIGRATION & INTEGRATION 217,227 (discussing Canadian private refugee spon-
sors' frustrations with refugees' "unrealistic expectations" that sponsors be "on call at all times").
290 Cf. id.
291 See id.
292 See MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 3 1-
35 (2002) (discussing the lack of "accountability mechanisms" over private organizations receiving
public funding).
293 Cf. Krzystof Kotsarski & Samuel Walker, Privatizing Humanitarian Intervention? Mercenar-
ies, PMCs and the Business of Peace, 7 Ius GENTrUM: COMP. PERSP. L. & JUST. 239, 257 (2011).
294 E.g., Guide to the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, GOV'T CANADA (last updated
May 26, 2017), http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/ref-sponsor/index.asp [https://
perma.cc/GZW3-LDLG] [hereinafter Canadian Private Refugee Sponsorship program].
295 See MINOW, supra note 292, at 142 ("It should not be controversial to insist that public values
follow public dollars.").
1262 [Vol. 58:1225
Asylum Seekers and Private Humanitarian Aid
C. The Case for Private Humanitarian Aid
Private individuals and NGOs have an important role in responding to the
needs of migrants. A complete exploration of the philosophical arguments re-
lating to the role of NGOs and private humanitarian actors in civil society is
beyond the scope of this Article, but at the most basic level, private humanitar-
ian aid is important because it defends human life and promotes related rights
articulated by international human rights law. 296 It further stands to strengthen
civil society by providing a space for individuals to act freely and to strengthen
democratic capacities of those who participate.29 Finally, it provides an ave-
nue for expressing dissent from government policy and constructing a positive
vision of the law.298
International human rights law protects many rights.299 Core rights relate
to life, bodily integrity, freedom of movement, and freedom from state-
imposed harm. 'o Asylum seekers are typically fleeing threats to these core
rights. Humanitarian aid in the form of funding or providing basic needs, such
as food, shelter, clothing, and medical care, helps preserve life-in either the
country of origin or in the asylum state. Acts of rescue along the way also pre-
serve life, often dramatically. 301 Such aid protects fundamental rights, because
without it some asylum seekers would lose their lives. In this way, private hu-
manitarian aid is valuable because it protects fundamental rights recognized by
international human rights law.
Promoting and protecting private humanitarian aid also stands to
strengthen civil society. As Corbett and other participants in the Sanctuary
Movement have noted, serving those in need remedies injustice more directly
than petitioning the government to pass a law to require government officials
to do the same. 1 2 Private humanitarian aid places the tools of justice in the
hands of non-state actors, empowering and strengthening those non-state ac-
296 See infra notes 299-314 and accompanying text.
297 See infra notes 299-314 and accompanying text.
298 See infra notes 299-314 and accompanying text.
299 See UDHR, supra note 125 (containing thirty articles, almost all of them declaring individual
rights); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (enumerating individual rights in the first twenty-seven Articles, for the most
part); ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW app. at 151-61 (2014).
300 The rights to life, freedom from torture, and freedom of movement are protected by both the
UDHR and ICCPR. UDHR, supra note 125, at arts. 3, 5, 13; ICCPR, supra note 299, at arts. 6, 7, 12.
301 See MOAS Saves Migrants at Sea in Record Numbers: More Than 1,400 Saved from Inhu-
mane Conditions in First Two-Week Mission, MOAS, https://www.moas.eu/moas-saves-migrants-at-
sea-in-record-numbers-more- than- 1400- saved- from-inhumane-conditions-in- first-two-week-mis sion/
[https://perma.cc/9UCE-GDEE] ("The search and rescue charity Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MO-
AS) helped rescue 1,441 people in just 12 days in back-to-back sea rescues from unseaworthy boats in
the central Mediterranean Sea.").
302 See Corbett, supra note 173.
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tors entrusted to "do justice" themselves.30 3 It is, in this sense, justice unmedi-
ated. It permits the expression of dissent30 4 but also the communication of a
positive vision of the law.30 5
Opportunities for private individuals and groups to aid asylum seekers
have other value for society as a whole.30 6 Acts of private humanitarian aid,
unlike state-sponsored humanitarian ction, embody and promote essential
freedoms, such as expression and association. 3 0 Individuals can join together,
publicly asserting their values, ideas, and visions through action and through
communication with others.30 8 More generally, engagement in associational
activities promotes pluralism, tolerance, and solidarity.30 9 Scholars have de-
fined pluralism as "the lively interaction among inherited particularities," a
process through which new particularities evolve.310 When people experience
pluralism and participate in a range of associational activities, individuals'
sense of their own effectiveness grows, promoting tolerance.3 This, in turn,
creates space for solidarity. 312 Ultimately, scholars have argued that participat-
ing in associational activities allows individuals to develop critical faculties
such as arguing, deliberating, decision making, and taking responsibility that
then redound to the benefit of a democratic society as a whole.313
The law should facilitate private humanitarian aid because it creates space
for ordinary individuals to act in big and small ways, and slowly change socie-
303 Corbett, supra note 173; Bezdek, supra note 181, at 910.
304 Cf Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115, 1147 (2009) (not-
ing that state and local governments enact "moving border laws" to express symbolic messages of
disagreement with the federal government).
305 See Bezdek, supra note 181, at 905.
306 See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a Representa-
tive Democracy, 7 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 555, 573 (1998) (summarizing Professor Michael
Walzer's view that "it makes good public policy to encourage the proliferation and strength of these
associational ties that constitute American civil society").
307 MINow, supra note 292, at 44 (noting that nonprofits play a key role in democratic society
through "vitaliz[ing] civil society," promoting First Amendment freedoms of association and expres-
sion, and "enable[ing] people to participate in running their lives").
308 Philosopher Hannah Arendt' s theory linking freedom to pluralism is particularly powerful in
this context. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 7 (1958) ("Action ... corresponds to the
human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.");
Hannah Arendt, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., (July 27, 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
arendt/#ActFrePlu [https://perma.cc/4GJN-D86Y].
309 See Bucholtz, supra note 306, at 576.
310 Id. at 573 (citing PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD I. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE
ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURE IN PUBLIC POLICY 206 (1977)).
311 Id. at 573.
312 Id. at 565 (noting that a leading commentator has concluded that "the nonprofit sector pro-
motes solidarity among individuals, and thereby empowers them to influence activities in the public
sector").
313 Id. at 576 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA516 (J.P. Mayer ed.
& George Lawrence trans., Harper Perennial 1966) (1840)).
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ty until a time when the humanitarian aid provided by private people is no
longer necessary. It provides "hope in the dark."
'3 14
III. LAW REFORM TO UNLEASH PRIVATE HUMANITARIAN
AID TO ASYLUM SEEKERS
Private humanitarian actors have the desire to assist asylum seekers, but
states also have an interest in criminalizing smuggling, trafficking, harboring,
and related conduct involving unauthorized migrants, including asylum seek-
ers. This Part considers potential reforms to mediate this seemingly impossible
division. It considers the broader context for asylum seekers' dangerous travel
and two specific responses: first, he notion of protected entry procedures; and
second, a humanitarian exception to smuggling and related crimes, or possibly
redefining smuggling to require proof of "material benefit, direct or indirect,"
consistent with the standard articulated in the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. 
3 15
A. Protected Entry Procedures
Under current legal regimes, asylum seekers must resort to dangerous
journeys to reach asylum states, thus triggering the need for search and rescue
and other humanitarian assistance.3 16 Scholars and policymakers alike have
called for asylum states' governments to issue asylum visas so that asylum
seekers can travel by air or other common carriers rather than on unseaworthy
vessels or other hazardous means. 31 7 Such a proposal has significant costs and
benefits,318 but inaction and a complete failure even to consider the matter has
taken a horrible human toll.31 9 Such measures should become a regular part of
314 See generally SOLNIT, supra note 1 (cataloging and comparing pivotal moments of social
activism across the globe from the late 1980s to the early 2000s).
315 Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 3.
316 See infra notes 317-319 and accompanying text.
317 Eakin, supra note 46 (describing the human toll of a lack of any legal course of travel for
refugees); Gregor Noll, Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to Entry Under International Law?, 17
INT'LJ. REFUGEEL. 542,573 (2005) (arguing that States ought to provide ProtectedEntry Procedures
to asylum seekers, although such an obligation is relatively weak); Ray, supra note 48, at 1218 (argu-
ing that the United States should issue asylum visas to individuals who demonstrate a credible asylum
claim in order to improve access to asylum as well as the amount and accuracy of the government's
information about individuals entering the country); Alexander Betts, Let Refugees Fly to Europe,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2tymlwg [https://perma.cc/KD33-53MB].
318 See Ray, supra note 48, at 1252-65.
319 To the extent that financial costs impede such programs, asylum states should consider creat-
ing opportunities for private individuals to fund additional consular staffing at embassies in key loca-
tions. This suggestion is inspired by an analog, the private refugee sponsorship program in Canada.
See Guide to the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, supra note 294. An analysis of the pro-
gram, which has inspired calls for a similar program here in the United States, is beyond the scope of
this Article. This Article focuses solely on asylum seekers who lack travel authorization. The private
refugee sponsorship in Canada, however, is focused solely on refugees, those permitted to travel for
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the conversation on the legal status of asylum seekers and the private humani-
tarian actors who assist them.
B. Governments Should Define "Smuggling" and Related Offenses to
Require Financial or Material Benefit or Adopt a
Humanitarian Exception
Second, governments receiving asylum seekers should reform anti-
smuggling statutes to shift the law's focus away from the prevention of border-
crossing and toward protecting migrants from exploitation. For-profit human
smuggling and trafficking produces serious harm, and exploitation is most
likely to occur when smugglers and traffickers engage in for-profit smuggling
and trafficking.3 20 The U.S. anti-smuggling statute currently imposes criminal
penalties on:
any person who-(i) knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or
attempts to bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever
[that alien] at a place other than a designated port of entry ... ; (ii)
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come
to, entered, or remain in the United States in violation of law, trans-
ports, or moves or attempts to transport or move ... such alien with-
in the United States... in furtherance of such violation of law; (iii)
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come
to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, con-
ceals, harbors, or shields from detection ... such alien in any place
321
The statute lacks any express exception for humanitarian smuggling, transport,
322shielding, concealing, or harboring. Instead, it criminalizes the facilitation of
noncitizens' unlawful presence,323 even if those noncitizens have a credible
asylum claim.324 Scholars, however, have observed that Congress never in-
resettlement purposes. The legal issues facing these populations differ based on their access to legal
authorization to travel to the asylum state; refugees enjoy such status, while asylum seekers do not. I
thank Elissa Steglich for highlighting the importance of this distinction.320 See Firas Nasr, Refugees and Trafficking: A Dangerous Nexus, HUM. TRAFFICKING SEARCH
(Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.humantraffickingsearch.net/wpl/refugees-and-trafficking-a-dangerous-
nexus [https://perma.cc/T4UA-PBHN]; Smuggling of Migrants: The Harsh Searchfor a Better Life,
U.N. OFF. DRUGS & CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/toc/en/crimes/migrant-smuggling.html [https://
perma.cc/4WCM-RLL7].
321 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2012). Omitted from the excerpt above, due to their limited
relevance, are provisions criminalizing knowing or reckless acts of "encouraging or inducing" an
unauthorized migrant to "come to, enter, or reside in the United States" and conspiracy to commit any
of the preceding acts. See id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)-(v).
322 Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i)-(v).
323 Jain, supra note 30, at 169.
324 See Leitman & Hudson, supra note 228, at 47-48; Loken & Babino, supra note 38, at 138.
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tended for the law to criminalize humanitarian aid,3 25 and thus, an exception
should be created explicitly in the legislative text to prevent the prosecution of
humanitarian actors. 126 Merely relying on prosecutorial discretion is insuffi-
cient to prevent this outcome, as evidenced by the sanctuary prosecutions of
individuals for sheltering or transporting unauthorized migrants who they be-
lieved were refugees eligible for asylum. 327 When government officials remain
free to target humanitarian actors, they will do so. The following subsections
discuss several specific options for pursuing reform.
1. Defining Offenses to Require Proof of "Financial or Material Benefit"
The first option is for legislatures to redefine smuggling and related of-
fenses to require proof of "financial or ... material benefit," thereby excluding
humanitarian assistance.3 28 The Migrant Smuggling Protocol defines smug-
gling in terms of acting intentionally "in order to obtain, directly or indirectly,
a financial or other material benefit."3 29 Such a broad benefit clause was de-
signed to close potential loopholes for smugglers receiving indirect benefits,
including sexual gratification, as related to child pornography rings or traffick-
ing schemes.330 Scholars note that the Protocol's Interpretive Notes reveal that
the parties did not intend for the Protocol to require states to criminalize hu-
manitarian smuggling by family, religious groups, or NGOs.331 Thus, the one
major international treaty on the subject insulates private humanitarian actors
from criminal liability for humanitarian smuggling. 
33 2
325 Jain, supra note 30, at 169 (discussing Congress' preoccupation with preventing entry of
"economic migrants").
326 See Campbell, supra note 38, at 72; Breslin, supra note 37, at 217; Loken & Babino, supra
note 38, at 161; cf Helton, supra note 32, at 554-58 (describing prosecutions of sanctuary workers).
327 See supra notes 162-190 and accompanying text.
328 This is the standard in the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. European NGOs engaged in rescue
work have endorsed this idea of distinguishing for-profit smuggling from humanitarian transport of
asylum-seekers. On this view, where private actors transport migrants for profit, such acts should be
illegal (and barred by laws against "human trafficking"). On the other hand, where private actors
transport migrants for free, such acts should not be criminalized at all, because such actors are not
seeking to exploit migrants or profit from their work on behalf of migrants. This manner of distin-
guishing smuggling from trafficking, however, does not track migrants' consent. Smuggling typically
refers to voluntary transit, for profit or not, while trafficking implies involuntary transit. IRPA
§§ 118-119; see Sea-Watch Rescue Blog, supra note 52.
329 Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 21, at arts. 3, 6.
330 GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 365-66.
331 Id. at46.
332 The Migrant Smuggling Protocol is not a human rights instrument, but rather an agreement o
coordinate criminal sanctions across UN member states for human smuggling. Thus, its failure to
criminalize humanitarian assistance does not indicate that a signatory may not criminalize it, but simp-
ly that signatories are not required to criminalize it. See id. at 48 (discussing the Migrant Smuggling
Protocol's lack of victim protection and assistance provisions and noting that, "the Protocol is essen-
tially an instrument of international cooperation"); Grant, supra note 259.
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It is critical to consider the implications of the "financial or material bene-
fit" standard on the influential Migrant Smuggling Protocol. For example,
would salaries received by employees of rescue organizations count asfinan-
cial or material benefit, direct or indirect, thus requiring that all rescue be per-
formed on a volunteer-basis or without the provision of food, drink, or safety
equipment to workers?333 Or might the law be construed to require that the
benefit comefrom the provision of service to the smuggled migrants, such as
payment by family members or smugglers from an earlier leg of the journey?
An analogy to insider trading liability, in the context of liability for tip-
pers who reveal inside information about a corporation and tippees who trade
on that inside information, under U.S. securities law might prove instructive.
334
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that a tipper breaches a duty if, for
example, the tipper "receives a direct or indirect personal benefitfrom the dis-
closure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate
into future earnings."33 5 Thus, in a sense, the disclosure itself must be the
source of the benefit-not a random third party.33 6 As applied to the example
of salaried NGO employees, one might compare the NGO employee to a tip-
per, and the rescued migrant to the tippee. In rescuing a migrant, the NGO em-
ployee performs a service, just as a tipper would offer a service to the tippee in
the form of a disclosure of information. But in the usual case, the NGO em-
ployee would not receive a financial or material benefit from performing the
service (the "disclosure"). Instead, the NGO employee's financial or material
benefit-the salary for working as an NGO staff member, for example-would
be attributable to potentially unknown philanthropic donors. This is like a tip-
per disclosing information, doing nothing else, and then enjoying a nice dinner
out, his friend's treat, to congratulate him on his work anniversary. Such a ben-
efit has nothing to do with the particular act of service or "disclosure," alt-
hough it might relate generally to the work the tipper does. Thus, one can ar-
gue that, even though the current international framework lacks such nuanced
treatment of private humanitarian actors, there are workable frameworks avail-
able to parse liability to target better the population of smugglers the parties to
the treaty intended to target, but without ensnaring humanitarian actors, even
those who earn salaries for their work. Ultimately, humanitarian actors might
passively receive benefits (from someone) while transporting unauthorized
migrants, but this is not equivalent to those actors transporting unauthorized
migrants for the purpose of receiving financial or other material benefits.
333 See Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 6.
334 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647 (1983).
335 Id. at 663 (emphasis added).
336 Id. (emphasis added).
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2. Recent Canadian Precedent
Heeding the Migrant Smuggling Protocol's framework, the Canadian Su-
preme Court recently struck down Canada's anti-smuggling law as unconstitu-
tionally overbroad due to its possible application to humanitarian actors. 337 At
the relevant time, section 117 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
("IRPA") stated: "No person shall knowingly organize, induce, aid or abet he
coming into Canada of one or more persons who are not in possession of a vi-
sa, passport or other document required by this Act." '338 The Canadian Supreme
Court recently determined that the statute unconstitutionally failed to distin-
guish humanitarian smuggling from for-profit smuggling. The court character-
ized the text of the disputed provision as "broad." 9 The court also determined
that the actual object of the statute was narrower on account of Canada's inter-
national obligations, the role of the disputed provision in the overall scheme,
and statements of legislative purpose at the time the statute was passed. 4
First, the court examined Canada's international obligations, focusing on
Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, which prohibits states from penalizing
refugees' illegal entry when refugees flee a place where "their lives or freedom
are threatened" and who promptly seek to "show good cause" for entering the341
country without authorization. Canadian law reflects this principle, as IRPA
section 133 prohibits the authorities from charging foreigners with "illegal en-
try or presence while their refugee claims are pending.342 The court further
noted that refugees often flee in groups, and thus, may aid others in entering
Canada illegally. A state cannot punish refugees solely for their act of aiding
others in illegal entry. The court also determined that the Smuggling Protocol's
material or financial benefit element indicates a desire not to criminalize hu-
manitarian smuggling. Although states are free to do so, the Protocol's "sav-
ings clause" provides that the Protocol shall not affect states' other responsibil-
ities and obligations under humanitarian and human rights law. Thus, the court
determined that the disputed provision's purpose must be harmonized with
Canada's international obligations to limit it to smuggling in the context of
343organized crime.
337 Appulonappa, 3 S.C.R. 39,69 (finding the Canadian Parliament did not intend to criminal-
ize humanitarian assistance to unauthorized migrants). I thank Audrey Macklin for directing me to this
decision.
338 Id. 19. Canada's anti-smuggling law addressed smuggling only-the transgression of the
Canadian border-and not subsequent assistance, unlike the U.S. anti-smuggling statute, which also
addresses post-entry acts such as harboring.
339 Id. 36.
340 Id. 34.
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The court next observed that the role of IRPA section 117 within the
broader statutory framework and the statements of legislative purpose also
supported finding a narrower purpose. Specifically, section 117 mirrors the
language of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, a scheme created to penalize
smuggling in the context of organized crime rather than humanitarian assis-
tance. 3 44 Further, at the time section 117 was adopted, the Canadian Parliament
expressly indicated its desire to shield humanitarian actors and immediate fam-
ily members from prosecution, but these concerns never made their way into
the statutory text. 3 45 The court determined that Parliament itself understood
that the statute would likely ensnare humanitarian actors, contrary to Parlia-
ment's intent.3 46 Nonetheless, Parliament apparently believed this possibility
would not come to pass because the Attorney General (AG) authorized all
prosecutions and presumed that the AG would not authorize the prosecution of
humanitarian actors. The Canadian Supreme Court rejected this purported safe-
ty valve of AG screening and concluded that, essentially, Parliament threw up
its hands and passed a law that codified a "drafting dilemma."
3 47
As a result, the court deemed the actual purpose of section 117 to be far
narrower than it initially appeared. Unlike U.S. First Amendment jurispru-
dence, Canadian jurisprudence regards a statute as unconstitutionally over-
broad if it "deprives individuals of life, liberty or security of the person in cas-
es that do not further [its] object. '3 4 As section 117 of IRPAcovered classes of
conduct beyond the narrow purpose of the statute, it was overbroad. Accord-
ingly, the court struck down the law and invited Parliament to redraft the anti-
smuggling statute.349
This result offers a point of comparison to the U.S. legal regime. In both
instances, the law-making bodies expressly indicated a desire not o ensnare
humanitarian actors. In the United States, government officials deliberately
pursued such prosecutions to advance an anti-migrant agenda years later. Can-
344 Id. 48; see also GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 366 (explaining that the Protocol's
drafting history "confirms that ... [the financial or material benefit element] was intended to ... [ex-
clude] ... the activities of those who provided support to migrants for humanitarian reasons").
345 Appulonappa, 3 S.C.R. 67.
346 Id. 68.
347 Id. 66.
34 Ild. 26-27. This overbreadth analysis differs significantly from the analysis under U.S. First
Amendment jurisprudence. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)
(noting that "the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not
sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge").349Appulonappa, 3 S.C.R. 86. The Canadian law was already narrower in scope than the U.S.
law, as it focused on transgressing the national boundary, not on transporting, harboring, concealing
or shielding upon entry. Nonetheless, the Canadian Supreme Court still found the law insufficiently
focused on the true "bad actors," for-profit smugglers. Id. It stands to reason that the U.S. law, which
more broadly covers harboring after entry and not merely transgression of the national boundary,
requires refinement as well.
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ada has a similar history of responding to asylum seekers and those who assist
them with prosecution and inadmissibility proceedings, where relevant.
3 50
Poorly drafted statutes from decades ago have inadvertently empowered to-
day's prosecutors to pursue harsh, anti-migrant policies.
3. Statutorily-Based "Humanitarian" Exception
Ultimately, the Migrant Smuggling Protocol and recent Canadian Su-
preme Court decisions suggest an emerging consensus that states should define
smuggling and related offenses to require "material benefit." The proposal,
however, is controversial, and some have criticized the "material benefit" re-
quirement as creating a loophole for smugglers. Arguing that prosecutors lack
methods at the border to investigate and uncover facts to prove this "material
benefit" element,51 critics contend that it can be impossible to prove that the
smugglers expected or received payment. 52 They assert the "benefit" element
has thereby suppressed convictions for for-profit smuggling.
3 53
To some extent, the choice for lawmakers is between over- and under-
inclusion. States may purport to prefer erring on the side of prosecuting too
many rather than too few, but the drafting history of the relevant statutes in the
United States and Canada indicates that legislators actually held no such pref-
erence.354 In fact, lawmakers in both countries expressed concern about the
effects of anti-smuggling laws on humanitarian actors or immediate family
members of smuggled persons. 3 55 At least one nation's highest court has found
over-inclusion impermissible.
35 6
As an alternative, to the extent that requiring proof of "benefit" may
thwart the prosecution of criminal, for-profit smuggling, states might consider
adopting a "humanitarian" exception. In 2006, the U.S. Senate considered a
humanitarian exception to certain offenses as part of comprehensive immigra-
tion reform. 157 The package of reforms never became law because the Senate
passed the bill containing them, but the House did not. 358 The text of this pro-
350 Grant, supra note 259.
351 Aijehani, supra note 242, at 128 (noting the difficulty of establishing "an intention or agree-
ment to receive payment" in the "initial stages of investigations" due to a lack of "investigative meth-
ods used at borders").
352 See id.
353 id.
354 See Appulonappa, 3 S.C.R. 38 (discussing Parliament's intention not to apply the anti-
smuggling law to humanitarian actors); Jain, supra note 30 at 160-61(discussing legislative history).
355 See Appulonappa, 3 S.C.R. 38; Jain, supra note 26 at 160-61.356 Appulonappa, 3 S.C.R. 77.
357 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611,109th Cong. § 205(c)(1) (as passed
by Senate May 25, 2006) [hereinafter CIRA]; see also 152 CONG. REC. S5174 (daily ed. May 25,
2006) (remarks of Sen. Durbin describing humanitarian exception).
358 See CIRA, supra note 357; S. 2611 (109th): Comprehensive Immigration ReformAct of2006,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s2611 [https://perma.cc/N4UC-FHJL].
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posal added a provision to the anti-smuggling statute that insulated humanitar-
ian aid from criminal liability:
It is not a violation of [statutory provisions prohibiting alien harbor-
ing, concealing, shielding, or transporting]... (B) for an individual
or organization, not previously convicted of a violation of this sec-
tion, to provide an alien who is present in the United States with
humanitarian assistance, including medical care, housing, counsel-
ing, victim services, and food, or to transport the alien to a location
where such assistance can be rendered.359
This illustrative list of forms of humanitarian assistance creates a "blanket ex-
ception" to criminal liability for all offenses other than smuggling, thus indi-
cating that humanitarian actors would still face liability for assisting unauthor-
ized migrants in entering U.S. territory, or "smuggling." 360
In general, where the description of a criminal offense is complete with-
out considering the exception, the absence of the exception is not an "element"
of the crime that the prosecution must prove.361 Smuggling and related offens-
es can be defined without reference to their humanitarian quality and without
consulting the list of exceptions. Thus, an exception to anti-smuggling statutes
would likely function as an affirmative defense rather than an element of the
statute that the government would have to prove. Under this regime, states
would initiate prosecutions of humanitarian actors for a smuggling-related of-
362fense. The humanitarian actors would then assert the statutorily defined de-
fense and bear the burden of proving that their work was truly "humanitarian."
This approach would insufficiently protect humanitarian actors because it
would subject them to criminal prosecution and only protect them from crimi-
363nal liability only later, offering immunity from liability, but not prosecution.
359 CIRA, supra note 357, § 205(c)(1) (proposed amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012)); see
Breslin, supra note 37, at 241.
360 Breslin, supra note 37, at 241-42.
361 See McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922) ("[I]t has come to be a settled rule
in this jurisdiction that an indictment ... on a general provision defining the elements of an offense
... need not negative the matter of an exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause."); United
States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 173-74 (1872) ("[I]f the language of the section defining the
offence is so entirely separable from the exception that the ingredients constituting the offence may be
accurately and clearly defined without any reference to the exception, the pleader may safely omit any
such reference.").
362 Senator Durbin described the proposed humanitarian exception in these very terms. See 152
Cong. Rec. S5174; see also Immigration Reform Bill: Senate Judiciary Committee Markup (C-Span
television broadcast Mar. 27, 2006) (Senator Durbin describing humanitarian exception as an affirma-
tive defense that defendant would have to prove).
363 Cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (describing qualified immunity as "im-
munity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability... "and noting that such immunity is "effec-
tively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial") (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
526 (1985)).
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Moreover, focusing on an "exception" for humanitarian assistance misses the
point that the "bad act" at the root of smuggling and related offenses is not
evading immigration authorities per se, but exploiting migrants' desperation to
procure financial or material benefit from their lack of safe travel options. The
"material benefit" standard captures this concern more effectively.
Ultimately, an affirmative defense would prove costly. Separating human-
itarian actors from for-profit smugglers requires time and expertise.3 64 Distin-
guishing the source of funds received by private actors, whether from donors
or from the migrants themselves, is another task that would require authorities
to parse facts and law carefully. Finally, subjecting humanitarian actors to
prosecution and only later eliminating liability stands to reduce the supply of
humanitarian aid. For all of these reasons, states might instead consider provid-
ing an administrative process of pre-approval for humanitarian actors,365 thus
preventing needless prosecutions and expenditure of time and money by gov-
ernments and NGOs.366
4. Accounting for Asylum States' Interests
Each of the proposals stands to frustrate national interests understood in a
367general sense. A humanitarian exception shields from liability NGOs and
individuals who, for reasons other than procuring financial or material benefit,
assist migrants, including asylum seekers. These migrants are typically indi-
viduals whom the government has not yet screened, thus implicating the na-
364 1 thank Martha Minow for making this point specifically and for raising the general possibility
of an administrative process to sort humanitarian from for-profit actors.
365 I thank Alyson Flournoy for raising this point.
366 The details of such a proposal are beyond the scope of this Article.
367 The proposals for reform also do not make or depend on distinctions among migrants. The
proposed statutory revisions apply equally, no matter whether an unauthorized migrant seeks refugee
status, some other form of humanitarian protection, or economic opportunity. Thus, the proposals are
not designed solely to protect those who assist asylum seekers, but to protect those who assist all un-
authorized migrants. Avoiding this outcome appears impossible. First, if proposed reform were to
apply exclusively to "asylum seekers," NGOs would not know whom to assist. Without asking ques-
tions first, an NGO or coast guard officer will not know if a given migrant intends to apply for asy-
lum, and is, thus, an asylum seeker. Often, questioning cannot occur during rescue operations, when
migrants are necessarily in distress. Second, a given boat of migrants could contain a mix of asylum
seekers and economic migrants. Requiring rescuers to sort asylum seekers from economic migrants
before rendering aid would likely prove unworkable. Finally, the distinction between the two groups
of migrants is not always clear, and some economic migrants may ultimately have good claims for
asylum, while some asylum seekers will ultimately lose their bid for refugee status and be deported.
Better distinguishing the groups would require NGOs to engage in more probing questioning about
the basis of the asylum claim-something ill-suited for situations where NGOs provide humanitarian
assistance, especially in emergencies. Many migrants are asylum seekers, however, and thus, the pro-
posals contained here will often, but not exclusively, apply to asylum seekers. I thank Gerald Neuman
for raising these issues.
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tional security and crime control interests of asylum states. 3 68 How might leg-
islators address this concern through the proposed reform?
3 69
One option is to limit the scope of the exception to exclude smuggling.
Under this option, the humanitarian exception would extend only to acts com-
mitted after entry in the asylum state, i.e., to transport and harboring offenses.
As in the Senate's proposal, the humanitarian exception could be limited only
to assistance rendered after the asylum seeker has entered on their own (or at a
minimum, without help from the NGO seeking immunity from liability).
3 7
Thus, NGOs would not be immune to liability for smuggling itself.
The law, however, ought to permit humanitarian smuggling when re-
quired under international law. When asylum seekers take dangerous journeys
on the high seas-whether from Libya or Haiti-the international duty to res-
cue applies,3 1 and humanitarian actors bringing asylum seekers to shore for
processing should not be subject to criminal liability for discharging their du-
ties. Criminalizing humanitarian smuggling-the act of bringing unauthorized
migrants to the frontiers of asylum states' territories-leaves NGOs with al-
most no alternative but to let refugees and migrants die in the water, a result
that violates international aw. 2 Thus, immunity from liability for humanitari-
an smuggling is necessary in such scenarios.
In contrast, humanitarian actors generally have no obligation under inter-
national law to rescue asylum seekers traveling by land, whether via Mexico or
Turkey. As a result, international legal duties do not compel smuggling in those
circumstances, and a more limited exception might be called for in such sce-
narios. Drafters of the humanitarian exception should consider these matters.
368 See supra notes 194-295 and accompanying text.
369 The most obvious route is to promote policies that permit willing donors to serve willing mi-
grants without imposing any third-party costs. A private refugee sponsorship program, for example,
would preserve the government's usual role in screening incoming migrants and would not otherwise
threaten asylum states' interests. See Guide to the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, supra
note 294.370 See 152 CONG. REC. S5174 (remarks of Senator Durbin describing humanitarian exception);
Breslin, supra note 37, at 241.
371 Nessel, supra note 117, at 626. This is not to suggest hat individuals and organizations on
land have a general obligation to bring asylum seekers to shore; rather, international law obligates
only those at sea who encounter distressed vessels to make reasonable rescue efforts. See UNCLOS,
supra note 117, at art. 98(1)(b).
372 See, e.g., International Convention on Salvage art. 10, Apr. 28, 1989, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-
12, 1953 U.N.T.S. 194 ("Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his
vessel and persons thereon, to render assistance to any person in danger of being lost at sea."); United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 98, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
("Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious
danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers ... to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of
persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance."); Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
annex, at c. 5, regulation 10, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47 ("The master of a ship at sea which is in a
position to be able to provide assistance, on receiving a signal from any source that persons are in
distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance.").
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Canada's legal regime, which prohibits the criminalization of humanitarian
smuggling, is well-suited to its particular status as an asylum state that receives
large numbers of asylum seekers who have traveled by sea.3 3 In contrast, such
a regime may ultimately be wrong for the United States, which has a porous
border with Mexico, a country that itself receives a large number of asylum
seekers fleeing violence.3 4
Humanitarian aid is not a cure for the suffering of millions of asylum seek-
ers, but it is a way of creating organic change; of slowly untying a seemingly
indissoluble knot of violence, poverty, insecurity, and exclusion through uncoor-
dinated, unmediated action. Protecting humanitarian actors is an important step
in creating a culture that values human lives, even migrant ones.
CONCLUSION
Individuals and organizations around the world provide or wish to pro-
vide humanitarian aid to asylum seekers, and such aid currently manifests in
many forms and in a range of places-from the asylum seeker's home country
to the asylum state and all points in between. The laws prohibiting smuggling
and related offenses in the United States and the European Union criminalize
much of this aid. At the very least, these laws create a cloud of legal uncertain-
ty under which humanitarian actors provide aid with some risk of prosecution.
Until recently, Canadian law did the same. These laws, although over-
inclusive, are based on core interests in national security, crime control, and
economic preservation.
By acknowledging these core interests but also exposing their thinness,
this Article argues for a specific reform to ease the toll of the dilemma. Specif-
ically, it proposes law reform: creating a humanitarian exception to anti-
373 See Appulonappa, 3 S.C.R. 5 ("[I]nsofar as [the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act]
permits prosecution for humanitarian aid to undocumented entrants, mutual assistance amongst asy-
lum-seekers or assistance to family members, it is unconstitutional."); CANADIAN COUNCIL ON REFU
GEES, SUN SEA: FIVE YEARS LATER 14 (Aug. 2015), http://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/sun- sea-
five-years-later.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TQT-NPBE] (noting the Canadian government's "increased
priority" to "disrupt people smuggling, especially by sea"). But see Mike Blanchfield, HaitianAsylum
Seekers Flee to Canada After Trump Proposes End to Protected Status, GLOBAL NEWS (Aug. 27,
2017), http://globalnews.ca/news/3699160/haitian-asylum- seekers-canada-trump-end-protected-status/
[https://perma.cc/EG4R-QN7U].374 See John Burnett, U.S.-Mexico Border Sees Resurgence of Central Americans Seeking Asylum,
NPR (May 31, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/05/31/480073262/u-s-mexico-border- sees-resurgence-
of-central-americans-seeking-asylum [https://perma.cc/W436-HWSB] (noting that although "U.S.
Border Patrol averaged 330 apprehensions of Central Americans a day," the agency nevertheless
"ends up releasing the vast majority of family members it apprehends because U.S. court rulings re-
strict its ability to detain them"). But see W. Gardner Selby, Barack Obama, in Austin, Says Illegal
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harboring and anti-transport laws and, in some instances, anti-smuggling laws.
It further proposes law reform through which asylum seekers can obtain travel
authorization or status prior to making a long, perilous journey to the asylum
state. Such reforms would potentially obviate the need for much of the private
humanitarian aid provided today.
The widespread desire to provide private humanitarian aid to refugees and
migrants, and the pervasive criminalization of such aid create a dilemma that is
neither new nor unique to this context. Scholars have rightly characterized the
clash of state sovereignty, border control, and individual human rights as a
"wicked problem."375 Such problems do not lend themselves to neat solutions,
either in law or politics.3 6 They often point to the need for large-scale institu-
tional transformations. Here, the dilemma identified is a symptom of a legal
regime that is not equipped to regulate migration and protect refugees effec-
tively.377 Without economic, political, and social development in refugee-
producing countries and reductions in global inequality, little will change, and
the demand to reach asylum states-by any means necessary-will only
rise.1
71
These stark global trends create the backdrop and impetus for the re-
sponses that have followed: individuals and NGOs in the United States and
around the world working, individually, locally, and immediately, to meet the
urgent needs of those seeking refuge. They are sending donations to rebuild
war-torn villages; rescuing asylum seekers making perilous journeys; sending
baby carriers to ease the physical burdens of refugee parents crossing a conti-
nent with young children in their arms; and welcoming asylum seekers with
food, shelter, clothing, foreign language instruction, and other necessities to
help them integrate into the asylum states they have reached while awaiting the
adjudication of their claims for asylum.
115 GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 18 (quoting JEFFREY CONKLIN, DIALOGUE MAP
PING: BUILDING SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF WICKED PROBLEMS 13-16 (2006) (describing criteria
for so-called "wicked problems")).
376 Id. (defining a "wicked problem" as a dynamic problem that is difficult to define or resolve
"because of preexisting factors that are themselves highly resistance to change," such as "the very
existence of States, gross inequalities among them, and strong motivations on the part of some to keep
out others").
377 See id. at 17 ("Migration is one of the oldest strategies of human advancement and.., it is
unsurprising that he modern Nation State, specifically liberal democracies, are not up to the task of
stopping it.").
378 Id. at 18 (asserting that smuggling will endure as a key method of unregulated migration un-
less there is a "fundamental change to global migration governance," and that to deny this fact is a
"willful disregard of both evidence and experience"); see also id. (quoting the U.N. Special Rappor-
teur on the Human Rights of Migrants opining that escalating "repressive mechanisms [in response to
migration] ... will not lower the pressure ... it will only exacerbate the tensions, fuel international
criminality and result in more rights violations for the migrants themselves").
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Asylum states and the international community can do more. They can
facilitate the work of private humanitarian actors. Public-private partnerships
and collaborations are not new, but they are increasingly important in emer-
gency situations. Moreover, although private humanitarian aid is no substitute
for effective, humane government policy, it constitutes a form of profound en-
gagement in the world.3 79 To criminalize private humanitarian actors' direct
service to asylum seekers is to deny completely any role for private actors in
the assertion of asylum rights, an extreme position not justified by states' inter-
ests. Taken together, the proposals articulated in this Article offer a humane
path forward.
379 See Corbett, supra note 173; see also SOLNIT, supra note 1, at 95 ("These other versions of
what revolution means suggest hat the goal is not so much to go on and create the world as to live in
that time of creation, and with this the emphasis shifts from institutional power to the power of con-
sciousness and the enactments of daily life, toward a revolution that does not institute its idea of per-
fection but opens up the freedom for each to participate in inventing the world.").
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